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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
The corporate income tax was enacted in the United 
States in 1909 and was subsequently instituted on a world-
wide basis. In 1986, 2.36 trillion dollars or 64% of the 
gross domestic product originated in non-financial corporate 
institutions alone [Rosen, 1988]. Given the extent and 
length of time the tax has been in place, it seems reasona-
ble to assume that its economic and social effects would be 
well known. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
At the most fundamental level, there is no general 
agreement as to who really bears the economic burden of the 
tax. Some believe that it is borne solely by the 
corporation, and therefore, by its shareholders. For 
example, Goode [1951] has long been a staunch supporter of 
this view. Adelman [1957], Hall [1964], and Oakland [1972], 
among others, have provided empirical evidence that is 
consistent with this proposition. 
Others believe that the tax is fully shifted to 
consumers by way of higher prices andjor to labor through a 
systematic reduction in the net wage rate. For example, 
1 
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based on the results of their econometric study, Kryzyzaniak 
and Musgrave [1963] concluded that the corporate tax was 
fully shifted to prevent a decline in the net rate of return 
on corporate investment. After reviewing the early 
empirical work on shifting, Ratchford and Hahn [1957] came 
to essentially the same conclusion - a substantial port1on 
of the corporate tax had been shifted. 
Still others believe that a partial shifting occurs and 
that shareholders, labor, and consumers bear the burden of 
the corporate tax, although not proportionately. Bayer 
[1970] provided the first empirical evidence as to the 
existence of a partial shifting to wage earners. Examples 
of other empirical evidence consistent with the partial 
shifting view include Beck [1950] and Lerner and Hendrick-
sen [1956]. 
Yet another v1ew is that the owners of capital in both 
the corporate and the non-corporate sectors bear the burden 
of the tax. The strongest proponent of this view 1s 
Harberger [1962]. Using a general equilibrium framework, 
Harberger concluded that the owners of capital bear almost 
100 percent of the burden of the corporate tax. 
Although there has been considerable research done in 
this area, there remains no more controversial issue in 
taxation than the question, "Who bears the corporate income 
tax [Pechman, 1985]? 11 Due to various methodological 
problems which will be addressed in Chapter IV, empirical 
research has yet to provide conclusive evidence to support 
any position. The purpose of this study is to apply a 
methodology that should provide insight into the econom1c 
burden of the corporate income tax. Specifically, an 
events study methodology will be used to examine the 
incidence of the corporate income tax in the life insurance 
industry. 
Before discussing the research design and methodology, 
it may be helpful to define some basic terms and concepts. 
These are examined in the following section. 
The Incidence Concept 
3 
Over the years there has been considerable controversy 
over the meaning of the term tax incidence. The traditional 
approach, and the one taken in this research, is to relate 
incidence to economic burden. Therefore, the focal point of 
the analysis will be on the individual, or class of in-
dividuals, who actually pay the tax. It is this direct 
money burden that defines the ultimate incidence of any tax 
[Dalton, 1954]. 
Consistent with the discussion above, reference will be 
made to two types of incidence: statutory incidence and 
economic incidence [Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989]. Statutory 
1ncidence refers to those taxpayers who have the legal 
responsibility for payment of the tax. In contrast, 
economic inc1dence is concerned with who really bears the 
burden. Operationally, economic incidence is defined as the 
change in the distribution of private real income brought 
about by the tax.l 
Private real income may be affected by either a change 
in the sources of income, uses of income, or both. The 
effect on the sources side depends on how the tax changes 
4 
the distribution of income among labor and capital (commonly 
referred to as factors of production).2 on the uses side! 
private real income is affected by changes in commodity 
prices brought about by the tax.3 
At this point, a d1stinction should probably be made 
between the incidence of a tax and the effects of a tax. 
Conceptually, the effects of a tax could include changes in 
productivity, factor usage, the propensity to save, the 
labor leisure choice and the consumption pattern of goods. 
These particular effects are not addressed in this study. 
The goal of this research is to determine to what 
extent, 1f any, the statutory incidence of the corporate 
income tax of life insurance companies differs from its 
economic incidence. This difference is the amount of tax 
!However incidence has been defined, the effect of the 
tax on the distribution of real income for private use has 
been considered extremely important [Pechman, 1985; Peacock, 
1969; Musgrave, 1959]. 
2Econom1c 1ncidence (at least as it refers to the 
sources side) may then be calculated by using information as 
to the proportion of each individual's income from capital 
and labor. 
3Economic incidence is then a function of the 
propensity of the different income classes to consume the 
commodities affected. 
burden passed on to labor andjor consumers and is referred 
to as the amount of tax shifting. 
Research Design and Methodology 
5 
As previously discussed, the purpose of this research 
is to provide evidence as to the amount of the corporate tax 
burden remaining on the corporate shareholder of life 
insurance companies. To this end, an events study 
methodology will be applied to investigate tax incidence. 
Maintaining the assumption of efficient market hypothesis in 
the semi-strong form [Fama, 1970], the stock price reaction 
to a tax law change should provide an unbiased expectation 
of the discounted future cash flow effects of the 
legislative action. In terms of tax incidence, the market 
behavior should provide evidence as to the amount of the tax 
burden borne by the stockholders of the company. Shifting 
will have occurred to the extent that the amount borne by 
the stockholders differs from that imposed by statute. 
The specific tax law change examined in this study is 
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959. The 1959 
Act was chosen for four reasons. First, the 1959 Act 
substantially increased the corporate income tax burden of 
life insurance companies. For the companies in the sample, 
the average increase in corporate taxes was nearly 90 
percent. Second, the 1959 Act did not contain any other tax 
policy changes, such as the investment tax credit, that 
might produce confounding affects. Third, since the 1959 
Act was intended to be a permanent solution to the problems 
of taxing life insurance companies, it is reasonable to 
assume that the market would make a long-term assessment of 
the changes. Finally, as detailed in Chapter IV, the life 
insurance industry and the 1959 Act have already been the 
subject of two extensive econometric tax incidence studies. 
6 
A two stage process was used to determine the extent of 
shifting of the corporate income tax in the life insurance 
industry. , Stage one consisted of an estimate of the 
statutory tax burden imposed under the 1959 Act for the 36 
companies in the sample. Next, the estimate of the 
statutory burden was used to predict stock price reactions 
under various shifting assumptions. The stock price 
reaction was intended to capture the amount of the economic 
burden of the tax that remained on the shareholders of the 
life insurance companies. Again, shifting will have 
occurred to the extent that the economic burden differs from 
the statutory burden. The second stage of the analysis 
involved estimating the stock price reaction to the 1959 
Act. This was accomplished by applying a modified version 
of the standard events study methodology. 
The methodology applied in this study addresses a major 
criticism of prior empirical research into the incidence of 
the corporate income tax. The criticism is that these 
studies fail to isolate the tax effect from other economic 
factors bearing on the determination of the corporate rate 
of return on capital. Given efficient capital markets, the 
7 
cash flow effect of the legislation should be quickly and 
accurately impounded in stock prices. By focusing on rates 
of return on or around key event dates, any abnormal returns 
should provide a direct and unambiguous means of judging tax 
induced reactions. 
Motivation for the Study 
Tax Policy Implications 
The corporate income tax is but one component of an 
overall taxation policy. Taxation, in general, has three 
1mportant goals: to transfer resources from the private to 
the public sector; to distribute the cost of government 
fairly; and to promote economic growth, stability and 
efficiency [Pechman, 1985a). 
The corporate income tax plays a significant role in 
the goal of transferring resources from the private to the 
public sector. In 1985, receipts from the tax totalled 80.4 
billion dollars [Rosen, 1988]. Only the personal income tax 
and the social security tax generated more federal revenues. 
The effect of the corporate income tax on equity and 
economic factors is less clear and is subject to much 
debate. 
Most authors in public finance agree that a knowledge 
of who bears the tax is fundamental to understanding the 
social and economic implications of any tax policy. 
Krzyzaniak [1966, p.255] notes that "the place of the 
corporate income tax in the tax structure depends quite 
fundamentally on whether or not it is taken to be shifted." 
Along the same line, Rolph and Break [1961, p.236] state 
that "undertaxation or overtaxation of corporate income in 
relation to other income relies heavily on whether or not 
the tax is shifted." 
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One of the most important effects of taxation is the 
distribution of its burden. Musgrave [1959] shows that, 
conceptually, the distribution of the tax burden is 
dependent on the incidence of the various taxes. Based on 
simulation results, Pechman [1985b] concludes that the 
incidence of the corporate and property taxes are the two 
critical factors in determining the progressivity of the tax 
system. 
McLure and Ture [1972] note that without a clear under-
standing of the incidence of the corporate income tax, it is 
impossible to assess its impact on international commerce, 
world-wide tax harmonization, and intercountry balances of 
trade. Goode [1951] sees incidence as affecting pricing 
policies for bus1ness firms. Finally, Harberger [1962] con-
cludes that tax shifting is an important factor in determin-
ing the investment rate of return in both the corporate and 
the non-corporate sectors of the economy. 
It should be noted that tax shifting doesn't 
necessarily contravene federal tax policy. There are 
certain taxes that are fully 1ntended to be shifted. For 
example, the burden of sales and excise taxes are generally 
intended to be shifted from the seller to the consumer. 
However, the corporate income tax is not considered to fall 
in this category.5 
The possibility that part or all of the corporate 
income tax burden might be shifted has long been recogn1zed 
9 
in the economics literature [Seligman, 1926; Musgrave, 1959; 
Due and Frielander, 1977; Auerbach and Feldstein, 1987]. 
Although not referring specifically to the corporate 1ncome 
tax, John Locke, perhaps somewhat cynically, states the 
problem encountered by the taxing authority: "Struggle and 
contrive as you will, lay your taxes as you please, the 
traders will shift it off from the1r own gain" [quoted in 
Rosen, 1988, p.264]. 
In summary, corporate tax incidence is seen to have an 
1mpact on a variety of economic activities. The posited 
effects range from influencing pricing decisions by 
individual firms to causing distortions in international 
commerce. In addition, tax shifting has implications for 
theories on the behavior of the firm and on empirical tests 
of stock price reactions to certain accounting changes. 
These are d1scussed briefly in the following section. 
Other Implications 
As Mieszkowski [1969, p.1103] notes, " ... incidence the-
ory is based on the marginal productivity theory of 
5Taxes whose burden is expected to be shifted are 
generally referred to as indirect taxes. Direct taxes, of 
which the corporate income tax is a member, are not intended 
to be shifted [Musgrave, 1959]. 
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distribution that assumes firms choose factor proportions so 
as to minimize costs, and set commodity prices at profit 
maximizing levels." Therefore, a test of shifting also 
constitutes a test of the behavior of the firm. 
Alternatively stated, the presence of short-run shifting 
indicates that firms are not operating at profit maximizing 
levels: a condition contrary to many economic theories. 
Incidence theory also has implications for empirical 
research into the stock price reactions of accounting 
changes that affect taxes. For example, if a tax increase 
can be fully passed on to consumers or labor, there will be 
no net cash flow effect on the firm. As a result, no stock 
price reaction would be expected (at least as it relates to 
the tax effect). If industries differ with respect to their 
ability to shift taxes, the research design must take this 
into account. 
Determining the economic incidence of the corporate 
income tax has proven to be a formidable task. The 
traditional approach taken has been to first determine if 
the tax has been shifted. The strategy of this study will 
be much the same.6 If shifting has occurred, research as to 
the direction (i.e. forward to consumers or backward to 
labor) should then be conducted. If no sh1ft1ng occurs, the 
econom1c burden clearly lies with the corporate 
shareholders. At a minimum, the research strategy chosen 
6The alternative of focusing on economic incidence 
without first answering the specific question of whether or 
not shifting has occurred does not seem practical. 
for use in this study should provide insight into the 
economic burden remaining with the statutory taxpayer. 
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The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as 
follows: A brief discussion of the life insurance industry 
and the taxation of l1fe insurance companies is g1ven in 
Chapter II. Chapter III contains an outline of modern tax 
incidence theory and a critical analysis of the situations 
where the theoretical results may not be appropriate in 
describing real-world phenomena. A review of the important 
empirical work to date is examined in Chapter IV. The 
methodology to be applied in the study is detailed in 
Chapter V and the results of the tests and conclusions are 
included in Chapter VI. Finally, Chapter VII gives a 
summary of the results along with limitations, tax policy 
implications, and possible extensions. 
CHAPTER II 
FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION OF THE 
LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Due to the unique nature of life insurance company 
operations, the formulation of satisfactory federal laws has 
proven to be a formidable task.7 As a result, the h1story 
of life insurance taxation has been one of constant change. 
Since the market's assessment of the shifting behavior in 
the life insurance industry should be based on an analysis 
of prior tax law changes, a cursory review of the events 
lead1ng up to the passage of The Life Insurance Company 
Income Tax Act of 1959 is provided 1n this sect1on. First, 
1t may be instruct1ve to outline a brief description of the 
life insurance industry. 
Industry Description 
At the organizational level the l1fe 1nsurance industry 
1s unusual 1n that 1t is comprised of both mutual companies 
and stock compan1es. Mutual companies operate in a 
cooperative-type arrangement and are owned solely by the 
7Two key factors contributing to th1s problem are: (1) 
the organizational structure of the compan1es operat1ng 
w1thin the 1ndustry, and (2) the long-term nature of the 
product sold. For a detailed analysis of the related tax 
pol1cy issues see Valent1 [1963]. 
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policyholders. Presumably, these companies are not 
established with the objective of making a profit for their 
owners. Rather, the focal point of operations is to reduce 
the effective cost of insurance protection. On the other 
hand, stock companies are organized for profit and must 
provide low cost insurance as well as directly compete with 
other firms for capital resources. 
At mid-year 1959, there were 1,407 u.s. based legal 
reserve life insurance companies in operation. Of this 
total, 151 were organized as mutual companies [Life 
Insurance Fact Book, 1960]. Although smaller in number, 
mutual companies are huge financial institutions which 
accounted for over 60 percent of the life insurance in force 
during the time covered by this study. 
During the period immediately preceding the 1959 Act, 
the life insurance industry experienced phenomenal growth. 
In the 1950's alone, the number of life insurance companies 
increased nearly 135 percent with life insurance in force 
rising 150 percent [Weinrel, 1959]. This growth can be 
partially explained by the effective method with which life 
insurance companies spread risk for policyholders and by the 
provision of a safe and convenient savings outlet [MacLean, 
1957]. Their product, a long-term executory contract, is 
generally written in two forms: whole life and term. 8 
BAt the end of 1959, roughly 39 percent of all new 
insurance issued was being written on a term basis [Life 
Insurance Fact Book, 1960]. 
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Whole life insurance can be seen as providing both a 
protective element and a savings element. The savings 
element is in the form of a "cash surrender value" which may 
be redeemed at anytime during the life of the contract. The 
face value of the policy will always be payable at the death 
of the insured. Term insurance differs from whole life 
insurance in two ways. First, there is no build up of a 
cash surrender value. Therefore, no savings component 
exists with term insurance. Second, death claims will only 
be payable if the insured dies within a stated period of 
time. This period may be one or more years and is usually 5, 
10, 15 or 20 years. Most policies issued on a term basis 
will not become payable as death claims, the probability 
being that the insured will outlive the term of the contract 
[MacLean, 1957]. 
Since life insurance companies are involved in 
matters of general social welfare, the industry has been 
subject to strict and detailed state regulation. 9 Although 
uniformity among states does not exist, the legislation 
generally has focused on standards of solvency, examination 
policies, non-discrimination rules, policy disclosures, 
specification of acceptable investment instruments, and 
state taxation. In addition, many states have attempted to 
9rn 1944, the Supreme Court firmly established the 
right of the federal government to regulate the insurance 
industry [United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, et.al., 332 u.s. 533 (1944)]. However, 
Congress subsequently passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 
Stat. 33 (1945) which expressly reserved most regulatory 
authority for the individual states. 
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limit the expenses of insurance companies by: (1) 
prohibiting the payment of pensions, political 
contributions, and excessive commissions; and (2) placing 
limits on salaries, expenses to secure new business, and the 
amount of new business that can be written in any one year 
[Huebner, 1950]. 
At the federal level, regulation has been limited to the 
area of taxation. Although subject to numerous changes, the 
normal corporate tax rate structure has been applied to l1fe 
insurance company operations since 1861. Despite this 
rather long history of taxation, the development of a 
permanent method of taxing life insurance companies was not 
accomplished until 1959. 
Evolution of the 1959 Act 
Between 1921 and 1958, the life insurance industry 
received preferential tax treatment in comparison with 
corporations in other industries. During this period, the 
federal tax base for both mutual and stock insurance 
companies consisted solely of their net investment income. 
Neither underwriting gains and losses (primarily changes in 
mortality and operating expenses) nor capital gains and 
losses were subject to federal income taxes. However, this 
method of taxation proved to be inflexible and often 
required legislative adjustments to address intra-industry 
inequities and to restore diminishing federal tax revenues 
[Whitman and Thompson, 1967]. 
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The legislative changes generally focused on the method 
used to determine the reserve requirements for future 
benefit payments. From 1921 to 1941, a fixed reserve rate 
was used by all life insurance companies regardless of the 
actual rate earned on assets which supported the reserves. 
The major problem encountered with this method of taxation 
was that the rate established by statute was higher than the 
rate assumed when the policies were written. The result was 
a deduction of expenses in excess of that actually incurred. 
When interest rates started to decline in the 1930's 
companies were unable to find investments which could 
generate enough earnings to satisfy their reserve needs. 
Since the statutory reserve rate remained unchanged, 
declining investment yields caused the federal tax 
liabilities of the insurance industry to fall substantially. 
In 1942,1° rather than addressing what seemed to be an 
unworkable taxing scheme, the Treasury changed from a fixed 
reserve rate to an industry ratio. However, in substance, 
the 1942 Act did nothing more than reduce the effective 
reserve rate. Although insurance companies were again 
paying federal income taxes, this condition would not last 
for 1 long. 
The inadequacies of the net investment income approach 
were once again highlighted in 1947 and 1948 when, despite 
continued growth in the industry, life insurance companies 
lORevenue Act of 1942, P.L. 753, (77th congress), 1942. 
17 
paid virtually no federal income taxes.11 During the period 
that followed, Congress seemed unable to d~velop a permanent 
method for taxing life insurance companies. Rather than 
repealing the 1942 Act, in 1950 Congress enacted the first 
of what became a series of net investment income "stop-gap" 
legislation.12 The 1950 Act was modified the following 
year and remained essentially unchanged through 1954. 
In 1956, the Mills Law13 was proposed as a permanent 
solution to the problem of life insurance company taxation. 
Although a fixed reserve ratio was still used, the Mills Law 
was more flexible in that it contained special provisions 
for companies which used especially high or low reserve 
interest requirements. Despite rather substantive changes, 
the Mills Law was only enacted on a one-year basis, retroac-
tive to 1955, and then subsequently extended to cover 1956. 
In 1957, representatives of the life insurance industry 
requested that the Treasury Department design a permanent 
method for taxing life insurance companies. However, early 
in 1958 it became apparent that no such proposal would be 
11under the net investment income approach, the 
interest rate used to calculate the deduction for policy 
reserves was established by statute. During 1947 and 1948, 
the rate of return on investment was declining whereas the 
rate used to calculate reserve deductions remained 
unchanged. The result was a decline in net investment 
income and the virtual elimination of federal income taxes. 
12Had the stop-gap legislation not been reenacted 
periodically, the provisions of the 1942 Act would have 
applied automatically. 
13Life Insurance Company Tax Act of 1955, P.L. 429, 
(84th Congress), 1956. 
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forthcoming so the Mills Law was once again extended one 
year to cover 1957 [Abelle, 1963]. Finally, in April of 
1958, the Treasury Department informed the House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman that it had developed an 
alternative solution to the taxation of life insurance 
companies. The details of the proposal, which ultimately 
became law, were first presented to the House Ways and Means 
Committee in November of 1958. On June 25, 1959, The Life 
Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 eliminated much of 
the uncertainty about federal taxes that had plagued the 
industry since 1948. 
The 1959 Act was made retroactive to 1958 and instituted 
an intricate "total income" approach to taxing life 
insurance companies. The result was a substantial increase 
in the tax burden of life insurance companies over that 
imposed by the previous "stop-gap" legislation. In 
addition, the preferential treatment that the life insurance 
industry had enjoyed since 1921 had come to an end. Life 
insurance companies now faced an effective federal tax rate 
comparable to that incurred by corporations in other 
industries [Whitman and Thompson, 1968]. 
The Life Insurance Company 
Income Tax of 1959 
Since actual tax liabilities will be used to estimate 
the stock price reaction to the legislative changes, only a 
general description of the provisions of the 1959 Act will 
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be provided. A more detailed analysis of the taxing scheme 
may be found in Stagliano [1977] or Abelle [1963]. 
As in prior legislation, the 1959 Act applies the normal 
corporate tax rate (30 percent) and the surtax rate (22 
percent) to life insurance company taxable income. In 
addition, a special 25 percent tax is imposed on the amount, 
if any, that long-term capital gains exceed short-term 
capital losses. Each calculation is independent and losses 
from one cannot be used to offset gains from the other. 
The increase in the statutory tax burden is a result of 
the base broadening provisions of the 1959 Act. Under the 
new method of taxation, the tax base (life insurance company 
taxable income) is calculated as the sum of three phases. 
Phase I is the smaller of net investment income or gain from 
operations. Although similar to the net investment income 
of prior legislation, the phase I base is larger for most 
companies under the 1959 Act. Phase II re-institutes a 
total income approach by taxing one half of the excess gain 
from operations over the phase I base. Finally, phase III 
is calculated as the amount of stockholders dividends paid 
from the untaxed portion of phase II. Since mutual 
companies have no shareholders, the phase III tax applies 
only to stock companies. 
This chapter included a description of the life 
insurance industry, a chronology of the events leading up to 
the passage of the 1959 Act and a cursory review of the 
provisions of the 1959 Act. During the 20 years preceding 
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the 1959 Act, the life insurance industry faced a wide range 
of effective tax rates including two periods where the 
industry paid virtually no federal income taxes. The 
important point to be made is that the numerous corporate 
tax law changes provided the market with several 
opportunities to assess any shifting behavior in the life 
insurance industry. The following chapter outlines modern 
corporate tax incidence theory along with the development of 
an a priori case for shifting behavior in the life insurance 
industry. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
General 
Before presenting tax incidence theory in detail, an 
issue related to the comprehensiveness of the tax and the 
appropriate analytical framework needs to be addressed. If 
a tax is levied on a single industry, and that industry is 
small in relation to the economy as a whole, partial 
equilibrium analysis is appropriate [Rosen, 1987]. In 
contrast, if a large sector of the economy is affected, the 
interdependencies between prices in the taxed and untaxed 
sectors must be taken into account. This requires the use 
of a general equilibrium framework. Since the focus of this 
study will be on a special tax on the life insurance 
industry, partial-equilibrium tax incidence theory 1s 
appropriate. This will be presented in the following 
section. 
Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
Partial equilibrium analysis is the most appropriate 
method for analyzing a tax which affects only a single 
industry [Rosen, 1987]. Using this approach, ramifications 
1n the untaxed markets are essentially ignored. This can 
21 
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only be done when the taxed industry is small in relation to 
the economy as a whole (as is the case with the life 
insurance industry in the U.S. economy). Assuming perfect 
competition14 and given the market setting just described, 
traditional tax incidence theory may be described as 
follows: 
In general, if a tax is imposed on capital in the 
insurance industry, there will be a decline in the rate of 
return earned by corporate shareholders. The result, will 
be a tax induced movement of capital out of the insurance 
industry to other industries where the yield on investment 
is higher. The ability of capital to make this move will be 
a function of the elasticities of supply and demand for 
capital and the time frame being considered. In the short-
run, a firm's capital (plant and equipment) is considered to 
be fixed. However, in the long-run, firms can make a 
complete adjustment to the environment and all factors of 
production are considered variable [Mansfield, 1977]. 
Short-Run Analysis 
In the short-run, the total supply of corporate capital 
is fixed (perfectly inelastic). In other words, the amount 
of previously invested capital is locked into the insurance 
14perfect competition is generally assumed when there 
are many firms operating within the industry. During the 
period under study, the life insurance industry was 
comprised of approximately 1,400 companies operating in the 
United States (see Chapter II for a brief description of the 
life insurance industry). 
industry. A graphical representation of the effects of 
imposing a tax on corporate capital is given in Figure 1. 
Rate of 
Return 
rg=r0 
s (k) 
Before Tax Yield 
After Tax Yield 
K Quantity of Corporate 
Capital 
r 0 = rate of return on capital prior to the 
imposition of the tax; 
rg = pre-tax rate of return; 
rn = after-tax rate of return. 
Figure 1. Imposition of a Tax on Corporate 
Capital: Short-run Analysis 
The decrease in demand causes the net return to capital to 
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fall by an amount exactly equal to the tax (i.e., rn = (1-
t) * r 0 ). Therefore, the owners of capital in the insurance 
industry will bear the full burden of the tax in the short-
run. 
Once plant and equipment have been purchased, nothing 
short of terminating operations can be done to avoid the 
tax. It cannot be passed on to the consumer since, in the 
short-run, each firm is faced with a horizontal demand curve 
for its product. Sales can only be made at the market price 
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and any attempt to raise prices will close the market to the 
seller (Mansfield, 1977]. Analogously, any attempt to shift 
the tax to labor will close the labor market to the firm.15 
Long-Run Analysis 
Although the supply of corporate capital is fixed in 
the short-run, it will not stay that way for long. As time 
passes, operations may be contracted by not replacing worn-
out equipment andjor previously planned expansion may be 
curtailed. If the rate of return in the insurance industry 
is less than that available elsewhere, individuals will 
invest where the yield is higher. The extent of the 
movement of capital out of the insurance industry will 
ultimately be determined by the industry's long-run elas-
ticities of supply and demand for capital. In relative 
terms, as supply becomes more elastic and demand becomes 
less elastic, more of the tax burden will be shifted (i.e., 
capital bears less of the burden). 
The elasticity of demand for capital will depend, in 
part, on the demand for the industry's output. The larger 
the elasticity of demand for insurance, the greater will be 
the elasticity of demand for capital. The demand for 
capital is also dependent on the elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital in the insurance industry, the 
share of capital used in production, and the elasticity of 
15The results are essentially the same in both 
competitive and monopolistic markets [Stiglitz, 1988]. 
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supply of labor (Layard and Walters, 1978]. The larger the 
elasticity of substitution (i.e. the easier it is to 
substitute labor for capital), the more elastic will be the 
demand for capital. As a general rule, the more selective 
the tax, the easier it will be for investors to avoid its 
burden. Therefore, supply and demand elasticities for an 
industry subject to a specific tax will tend to be larger, 
ceteras paribus (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989]. 
There is a special long-run case where incidence may be 
determined based solely on the elasticity of supply of 
capital. If the long-run supply of capital is perfectly 
elastic, the movement of capital out of the insurance 
industry will prevent the net rate of return on capital from 
falling (see Figure 2). 
Rate of 
Return 
K' 
' 
S(k) 
Before Tax Yield 
After Tax Yield 
Quantity of Corporate 
Capital 
Figure 2. Imposition of a Tax on Corporate 
Capital: Perfectly Elastic 
Long-run Supply of Capital 
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Under this condition, owners of capital are unaffected by 
the tax (the rate of return before imposition of the tax, 
r 0 , is equal to the net after-tax rate of return, rn>· As a 
result, the corporate tax is fully shifted to labor through 
lower wages andjor to the consumers through higher premium 
prices. 
Even if long-run shifting occurs, it is very difficult 
to determine when the effects of the tax will be fully 
manifested. However, the analytical works of Sato [1963] 
and Feldstein [1974] provide some important insights into 
the length of the process. Sato•s analysis indicates that 
it takes a full 130 years to reach equilibrium, with one-
half of the total adjustment being completed within 30 
years. Feldstein [1974] reports similar results. He 
concludes it will take 140 years from the initial post-tax 
equilibrium to reach a steady state-equilibrium. A full 
twenty years are necessary for one-half of the adjustment to 
be completed. 
Before concluding, an important point needs to be made. 
All long-run analyses critically depend on short-run 
incidence theory being correct. For if the corporate tax is 
fully shifted in the short-run, analysis of a longer time 
frame becomes irrelevant. All longer-run theoretical 
adjustments are dependent on a tax induced movement of 
capital out of the insurance industry. If the tax is fully 
shifted in the short-run, no such inducement exists. This 
is because the net rate of return to capital is unaffected 
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by the tax: a condition which would result in labor andjor 
consumers bearing the full economic burden of the tax. 
In summary, there is substantial consensus on the 
burden of the corporate income tax in the short-run: it will 
be on the owners of capital in the insurance industry. As 
the time-frame lengthens, and given that short-run theory is 
correct, the incidence of the tax will depend on the 
elasticity of supply of capital and the elasticity of demand 
for capital. Although the question of tax incidence seems 
to be reduced to that of obtaining accurate estimates of 
these key parameters, major qualifications to the theoret-
ical results become necessary when the highly restrictive 
assumptions underlying the economic reasoning are relaxed. 
These are discussed in the following section. 
The Shifting Mechanism 
As previously discussed, traditional incidence theory 
places the short-run incidence of the corporate income tax 
on the owners of corporate capital. However, total reliance 
on these abstract results obviates the need to consider 
shifting as a viable economic phenomena. Realistic 
modifications to the underlying assumptions may lead to 
significantly different results. For example, the ideal 
types of perfect markets which are used in the analysis 
simply do not exist in the real world [Mansfield, 1979]. 
Therefore, allowances must be made for behavioral reactions 
to a factor tax under conditions of nonperfect competition. 
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In addition, recent research into the behavior of the firm 
has generated serious questions about the motivations of 
corporate management. The classical assumption of profit 
maximization has been criticized on grounds that profits may 
not be the only, or even the primary, objective of 
maximization. Rather a firm may wish to maximize sales or 
market share [Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989]. Alternatively, 
Simon [1959], among others, has argued that a firm aspires 
to a "satisfactory" rate of profits; but not the maximum. 
Finally, there is considerable doubt as to the ability of 
managers to operate at profit maximizing levels when faced 
with conditions of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge about 
the states of nature. These qualifications, and their 
implications for shifting, are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Nonperfectly Competitive Behavior 
A key assumption of traditional tax incidence theory is 
that firms operate in perfectly competitive markets. 
However, nonperfectly competitive conditions appears to be 
more descriptive of actual markets. Unfortunately, there is 
no well developed theory of tax incidence under nonperfectly 
competitive conditions [Rosen, 1988]. The problem is that 
it is unclear how prices are actually'determined in such a 
setting. It is generally recognized that there are a wide 
variety of possible relationships, varying according to the 
degree of interdependence (oligopoly) among firms and the 
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strength of differentiation of products [Due and Frielander, 
1977]. Two oligopolistic pricing theories discussed in the 
literature are the following: price leadership and cost-plus 
pricing. 
Under conditions of price leadership, no one firm will 
wish to depart from the established price for fear of losing 
its sales if it raises price or having its competitors 
follow suit if it lowers prices. Mansfield [1979] describes 
two types of price leadership: dominant firm and barometric-
firms. Dominant-firm pricing is seen to occur in industries 
where there is one large firm and several small firms. The 
dominant firm sets the price and whatever the small firms 
don't sell, the dominant firm does. Under barometric-firm 
pricing, the first firm to raise its price is quickly 
followed by the other firms in the industry. The 
implication of price leadership for tax incidence 1s that 
shifting may occur to the extent that a tax increase serves 
as a signal to firms to raise their price in concert. 
Of course, not all oligopolistic pricing theories lead 
to the possibility that the corporate tax may be shifted. 
For example, each individual firm may believe that if it 
raises its price in response to the tax, that the other 
firms will not follow. If this is the case, none will raise 
their price. Therefore, the entire burden will fall on the 
producers. 
An alternative pricing theory under nonperfectly 
competitive markets is that of cost-plus pricing. Under 
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cost-plus pricing, a firm first estimates the cost per unit 
and then adds a markup to obtain a target rate-of-return.16 
If the tax is included as a cost of production17 or the 
margin is defined net-of-tax, then the pricing rule may lead 
to behavior which intends to shift the tax. Uncertainty is 
usually given as the most plausible reason for using 
standard cost-plus pricing [Penner, 1967]. Furthermore, 
fear of government, union, or consumer group reprisals may 
operate to restrain profit motivation in oligopolistic firms 
which have a high degree of market power [Musgrave, 1959]. 
When cost-plus pricing is used, the tendency is for 
profits to be below maximum levels. Unfortunately, theory 
cannot specify precisely the level of cost-plus pricing. As 
a result, it is unclear how far the oligopolist can go to 
recoup a net-of-tax profit level. The ability to shift the 
tax will depend on the existing amount of unrealized 
profits, the tax rate, the structure of cost and demand, and 
uncertain factors [Mansfield, 1979]. 
16There is a variety of cost-plus pricing schemes such 
as full-cost, average-cost and limit-pricing. The analysis 
and the 1mpl1cations for shifting are essentially the same. 
However, limit pricing, a price set to limit entry into the 
industry, may result in a greater difference between the 
established price and the profit maximizing price (at least 
in the short-run). 
17A survey of manufacturers indicated that most 
considered the corporate tax as a cost of production 
[Kimmel, 1958]. Also see Due and Frielander [1977], 
Musgrave and Musgrave [1989], among others. 
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Sales Maximization Behavior 
Sales maximization has been proposed as an alternative 
to profit maximization [Baumel,· 1973]. Baumel's argument is 
that firms seek to maximize total sales subject to a minimum 
profit constraint. Sales maximization is defended on 
grounds that management's success is often based on the 
firm's ability to obtain market share. Baumel [1973] also 
notes that there is a stronger correlation between 
management's compensation and sales than there is between 
compensation and profits. Sales maximization, however, is 
considered to be bounded by a requirement to attain some 
reasonable return on investment. According to Baumel 
[1973], the constraint is determined by the capital markets 
where firm value and the firm's credit worthiness are 
competitively set. It can be shown mathematically that, if 
the profit constraint is defined net-of-tax, there may be a 
behavioral pattern which leads to shifting (see Appendix). 
Satisficing Behavior 
The behavioral assumption of maximization has been 
questioned by Simon [1959] and Cyert and March [1964], among 
others. They assert that management attempts to attain a 
satisfactory rate of profit rather than maximizing either 
profits or sales.18 An important feature of their theory is 
18Along a similar vein, Galbraith [1967] maintains that 
the principle of profit maximization became obsolete with 
the separation of ownership and control in the firm. He 
contends that the corporation is dominated by a 
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the emphasis on organizational slack which is defined as the 
difference between total resources and necessary payments. 
The types of organizational slack that have the greatest 
implication for tax incidence are: (1) the setting of prices 
below that necessary to maintain adequate revenue from 
customers, and (2) the setting of wage rates higher than 
that needed to retain labor [Cohen and Cyert, 1965]. 
If satisficing behavior occurs, then organizational 
slack can be used as a stabilizing force to deal with 
changes in the external environment. Since an increase in 
the corporate income tax will result in lower profits, the 
firm may increase prices or reduce the wage rate so that the 
satisficing profit level is maintained. Presumably, the 
amount of shifting will depend, at least in part, on the 
amount of organizational slack in the firm. 
In summary, although the question of short-run shifting 
of the corporate income tax might be settled under 
traditional tax incidence theory, a number of modifications 
are in order. If certain conditions are met, the results of 
traditional incidence theory may not hold. These conditions 
are: (1) that firms treat the tax as an expense for price 
determination; (2) there is substantial uniformity in 
pricing policies within an industry; and (3) the firms, as a 
whole, are not maximizing profits. Such market conditions 
appear to be relatively descriptive of many industries in 
technostructure which seeks survival and autonomy through 
planning and stability. 
33 
the United States. Therefore, an increase in the corporate 
income tax, at least in certain industries, may lead to 
short-run adjustments in price and output, and thus, a 
shifting of the corporate tax burden. 
The point of the previous discussion is not to negate 
the usefulness, for analytical purposes, of abstract 
theories of tax incidence. Rather it is intended to 
identify circumstances where the theoretical arguments may 
not hold. In the short-run, modification to traditional 
incidence theory generally follows along two lines: (1) 
profit maximizing behavior occurs but markets are 
nonperfectly competitive, and (2) management pursues goals 
other than absolute profit maximization. Taken together, 
they cast serious doubt on the conclusion that owners of 
corporate capital must bear the burden of the corporate 
income tax in the short-run. These modifications are not 
' 
suggested simply for the sake of "realism," but to make some 
positive contribution to the question of tax incidence. 
The preceding analysis has merely shown that under 
conditions of nonperfect competition, the corporate income 
tax may be shifted. Whether or not shifting actually 
occurs, must ultimately be determined empirically. It is to 
that end that this research hopes to contribute. Rather 
than testing shifting for the entire corporate sector, the 
strategy of this research is to identify an industry where 
the qualifications to theory are most prevalent. If the 
theoretical results hold under these conditions, they are 
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likely to hold under more favorable market settings. 
Factors which tend to promote shifting in the specific case 
of life insurance companies are presented in the following 
section. 
A Priori Case for Shifting in the 
Life Insurance Industry 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that life 
insurance companies operate in a nonperfectly competitive 
market: a condition which is necessary for shifting behavior 
to occur. First, although there is some disagreement on 
this issue, evidence exists to indicate that price 
competition is seriously lacking in the life insurance 
market [Belth, 1966]. Second, the industry has many 
characteristics of an oligopolistic market. There is a high 
degree of industry concentration [Cummins, et al, 1972] and 
empirical evidence on returns to scale is consistent with 
that which would be expected to exist in an oligopolistic 
market [Houston and Simon, 1970]. Finally, Launie [1968] 
makes a strong argument that consumers do not have a 
reasonable amount of knowledge as to product cost in the 
life insurance market; a condition which may lead to market 
failure [Scitovsky, 1951]. 
Nevertheless, the existence of imperfect competition is 
not a sufficient condition for shifting to occur. Shifting 
will still be dependent on, among other things, the pricing 
mechanism employed. On this point, there is little 
disagreement as to the method used by insurance companies 
in determining premium prices. The insurance industry 
pricing scheme has been described as the purest form of 
cost-plus pricing used in the u.s [The Life Insurance 
Company Income Tax Act of 1959--Panel Discussion, 1960]. 
The implication is that, to the extent that the markup is 
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defined net-of-tax, shifting behavior may be the norm rather 
than the exception. 
Still, shifting will be limited to the amount of 
unrealized profits existing in the market.19 After an 
extensive examination of life insurance company operations, 
Walter [1962] concluded that profit maximization was not the 
primary objective of life insurance companies. Rather, 
market share and the amount of life insurance in force 
seemed to be a more important goal. Given the exceptions to 
the assumptions underlying traditional tax incidence theory, 
the life insurance industry seems to be a likely candidate 
for shifting behavior. Before discussing the methodology to 
be applied in the study, a review of the important empirical 
work on shifting will be provided in Chapter IV. 
19unrealized profits are the difference between the 
current profits and those which would exist if the companies 
were operating at profit maximizing levels. 
CHAPTER IV 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the number of qualifications to the results of 
tradit1onal tax incidence theory, it is not surprising that 
cons1derable empirical research has been done in this area. 
The research can generally be classified into three d1st1nct 
groups: (1) early research, which was basically descriptive 
in nature, (2) econometric analysis, and (3) analytical and 
s1mulation analysis. A review and critical evaluat1on of 
the more 1mportant works 1s presented in the following 
sect1ons. 
Early Empirical Research 
As noted in section Chapter III, the inclus1on of the 
corporate tax as a cost of production may lead to sh1ft1ng 
behavior on the part of management. Evidence to support 
this pos1tion was provided by Kimmel [1950].2° In a 
questionnaire to 1,000 manufacturing companies, 60 percent 
of the respondents reported that the corporate 1ncome tax 
influenced their pricing decisions. Although suggestive of 
20An earl1er study by the National Industrial 
Conference Board [1928], had shown that approximately 25 
percent of the managers surveyed considered the corporate 
tax as a cost of production. 
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management's attitude towards the tax, Kimmel's study is 
subject to criticism on two grounds: (1) the response rate 
was extremely low, 20 percent, and (2) no attempt was made 
to determine how important the tax was to the overall 
pricing decision. 
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Alternative methodologies focused on the effect of the 
tax on factor shares or on its effect on the rate of return 
on capital. Unfortunately, the early empirical studies, 
including Lerner and Hendriksen [1956], Beck [1950], Adelman 
[1957], and Ratchford and Hahn ~1957], among others, made no 
effort to separate the effects of the tax from other factors 
bearing on the determination of corporate earnings. There-
fore, it is generally recognized that these studies provide 
little insight into the shifting of the corporate tax 
[Mieszkowski, 1969; Due and Frielander, 1977; Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1989]. 
In the nineteen-sixties, concerted efforts were made to 
address the methodological problems of earlier empirical 
research. These systematic attempts to isolate the effects 
of the corporate tax generally applied one of two 
approaches. One examines the rate of return on capital 
around changes in the corporate tax. The other focuses on 
the changes in the share of corporate profits as a 
percentage of total income originating in the corporate 
sector. Empirical research applying these two approaches is 
examined next. 
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Econometric Analysis 
Rate of Return Approach 
The study of Krzyzaniak and Musgrave [1963] (hereafter 
referred to as K-M) was the first attempt to employ a model 
and to use sophisticated econometric techniques in the 
analysis of corporate tax incidence. The thrust of their 
study was the construction of a profit-behavior model which 
could be used to isolate the effects of the corporate tax 
rate from other exogenous variables influencing the rate of 
return on corporate investment.21 The profit-behavior model 
was used to predict the level of pre-tax profits that would 
have existed in the absence of any corporate tax rate 
changes. By using multiple regression techniques, K-M were 
able to compare actual pre-tax profits with those suggested 
by their model (absent any tax changes). Since year-by-year 
comparisons were made, the analysis was strictly short-run. 
The study was conducted using aggregate data of all 
u.s. manufacturing companies for the periods 1936 to 1942 
and 1949 to 1959. The primary conclusion was that the 
after-tax rate of return on capital was maintained at the 
level that would have prevailed in the absence of the tax. 
In fact, not only was the tax burden avoided, but it was 
overshifted. A $1.00 increase in the corporate tax seemed 
21Exogenous variables included: (1) consumption 
expenditures, (2) the ratio of inventory to sales, (3) tax 
accruals, (4) federal purchases, (5) the market interest 
rate of corporate bonds, and (6) federal balance budget variable. 
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to generate a $1.34 increase in the before tax rate of 
return.22 The authors subsequently qualified their results 
noting that, due to weaknesses in estimation techniques, the 
amount of shifting was probably overstated. However, even 
after certain adjustments were made to the model, K-M 
concluded that the corporate income tax had been over 100 
percent shifted. 
The K-M study has been the subject of prolonged and 
substantial criticism. The,most serious charge23 is that 
the model doesn't adequately isolate the tax influence from 
the other variables affecting the rate of return (i.e., 
model miss-specification). For example, during the period 
under study, there were several factors that tended to 
produce a high correlation between the tax rate and profits 
levels. These included both a high level of aggregate 
expenditure and full employment. Working within the K-M 
framework, but introducing a cyclical variable and a dummy 
variable to represent wartime mobilization, Cragg et al. 
[1967] replicated the K-M study. Their results indicated 
that no short-run shifting had occurred. More importantly, 
their study showed how sensitive the K-M model was to the 
data used. 
22Thurow [1971] argues that overshifting has not 
occurred but rather the tax has caused a decline in the 
corporate supply of capital which raises the rate of return. 
23K-M have also been criticized for failure to give a 
satisfactory a priori explanation of the possibility of 
immediate forward shifting. However, Bruno [1970] has 
provided analytical support for such a possibility. 
Goode [1966] and Sliter [1966] also questioned the 
adequacy of the K-M model to isolate the tax effect. They 
suggested that the tax variable was given undue weight 
40 
because other economic factors were not carefully modelled. 
Both authors introduced a "pressure variable," the ratio of 
actual to potential GNP, into the K-M model. The pressure 
variable was intended to capture the overall macroeconomic 
effects of capacity utilization, employment levels and 
aggregate demand changes. Using the modified K-M model, 
Goode and Sliter concluded that shifting was substantially 
less that than that originally reported by K-M (but still 
close to 100 percent).24 
Factor-Shares Approach 
The focus of the previous studies was on the effect of 
the tax on the after-tax rate of return on capital. 
However, a constant after-tax rate of return is not a priori 
evidence of shifting. If technological change was causing 
the marginal productivity of capital goods to rise during 
the period under study, the rate of return should also have 
been rising. Therefore, under these conditions, a constant 
after-tax rate of return would indicate no shifting. To 
address this problem, a factor-shares approach was proposed. 
The contention was that shifting occurs only to the extent 
24K-M have criticized the use of a "pressure variable" 
on grounds that it captures part of the effect of the tax 
and does not show the failure to shift [Krzyzaniak and 
Musgrave, 1963]. 
41 
that the pre-tax share of profits in income originating in 
the corporate sector increases. 
In an extensive study, Hall [1963] examined the 
behavior of relative factor inputs, factor outputs and 
income shares, in an attempt to assess the impact of the 
corporate tax on these factors.25 The analysis was based on 
a set of simplifying assumptions including: (1) a Cobb-
Douglas production function, (2) constant cost conditions, 
and (3) technological neutrality. Using an ordinary least-
squares technique to estimate various production functions, 
Hall concluded that the tax did not alter the input-output 
relations among the various factors. In other words, no 
shifting had occurred. 
The Hall study has also been subject to criticism. 
First, given the set of highly restrictive assumptions, the 
results may be very sensitive to the parameters chosen [Due 
and Frielander, 1977]. More importantly, only a 2.67 
percent change in the deflated hourly output would have 
resulted in a complete reversal of the conclusion (i.e., 
from no shifting to full shifting occurred). Therefore, as 
Musgrave [1964] noted, it would seem that the margin for 
error is too small to yield anything but very tentative con-
elusions. 
Hall's study was subsequently extended by Turek [1970]. 
Assuming a constant elasticity production function of 
25Although the first to apply a factor-shares approach, 
Adelman's [1957] study is subject to the methodological 
problems noted earlier in this chapter. 
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American manufacturing and a constant degree of monopoly 
power, Turek [1970] derived an estimation equation for the 
rate of factor shares. The model included a tax rate 
variable, a variable (time) to represent a constant rate of 
technological progress, a capital to labor ratio, and two 
cyclical variables as explanatory variables. Despite a 
rather large standard error for the tax rate variable, the 
author was able to reject the conclusion of full shifting. 
However, unlike Hall's [1963] study, partial shifting could 
not be ruled out. 
Gordon [1967] attempted to reconcile the conflicting 
results reached by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave [1963) and Hall 
[1963]. He derived an alternative model based on the 
assumption that mark-up pricing policies were predominant in 
u.s. manufacturing. Included in the formulation was a 
variable to account for changes in the productivity of 
capital. With this model, he was able to reconcile the 
conclusions of the factor-shares and rate of return models. 
The results indicated that, with the use of mark-up pricing, 
firms were able to maintain their profit margins as the tax 
increased. However, the stable profit margins were caused 
by the rising productivity of capital and not to any 
shifting of the tax burden.26 
Gordon's model is not without significant criticism of 
its own. For example, Sebold [1970] argues that the 
26Although shifting for the manufacturing sector was 
rejected, the shifting parameter was significantly positive 
for four industries and significantly negative for two industries. 
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underlying assumptions bias the results in the direction of 
no shifting.27 Nevertheless, the study's major contribution 
is that it shows the weakness in K-M's analysis of ignoring 
the productivity issue. 
Other studies 
Despite the rather extensive criticisms noted in the 
previous sections, the importance of the K-M model should 
not be understated. It was the first serious attempt to 
disentangle the tax effects from other economic factors 
bearing on the determination of the rate of return on 
capital. Even the K-M detractors have applied a profit-
behavior model in re-examining their results. 
Other studies have continued to replicate, revise, and 
extend the K-M model in the study of tax incidence. For 
example, Roskamp [1965] applied the K-M model to West German 
corporations and Spencer [1969] to Canadian corporations. 
Both obtained results very similar to that of K-M.28 
In a rather unique modification of the K-M model, 
Oakland [1972] used cash flows as a proxy for the dependent 
net income variable. His argument was that the only valid 
way to test for short-run shifting was to develop a model 
that violated the profit maximization hypothesis. Using his 
27The controversy surrounds the assumption of a constant 
ratio of profits to sales. Also see Gordon [1970] for a 
discussion of the problem. 
28see Davis [1977] for a summary of the foreign 
applications of the K-M model. 
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multiplicative cash flow model, Oakland concluded that the 
corporate tax was not shifted during the period between 1938 
and 1968. 
Both Kilpatrick [1965] and Levesgue [1967] took a 
different approach to the analysis of corporate tax 
shifting. The authors' contention was that industry 
concentration and the degree of shifting are positively 
related. The analysis was carried out by regressing the 
change in industry profits on a concentration index, while 
holding other variables constant. Their results indicated 
that full shifting had occurred in the manufacturing sector. 
As in the previous studies, the accuracy of their estima-
tions depend critically on how well they isolated the non-
tax factors. While Levesgue's analysis of Canadian 
corporations might be suspect, Kilpatrick's examination of 
u.s. firms is more complet~ [Mieszkowski, 1969].29 
A limitation of the Krzyzaniak and Musgrave [1963] 
study, as well as many of the other econometric studies, 
relates to its level of aggregation. If the objective of 
incidence studies is to determine the distribution of its 
burden, then the shifting parameter is insufficient. 
Distributional effects depend on the industries in which 
shifting is possible and the various magnitude of shifting 
within these industries. Therefore, if distributional 
29The results are somewhat questionable in that 
Kilpatrick [1965] also showed that, in pre-Korean War years, 
profits and concentration ratios were positively related for 
pairs of years in which no tax rate change occurred. Again, 
the model may have been miss-specified. 
effects are to be determined, a disaggregate analysis must 
be performed. Disaggregate studies, of differing levels, 
are discussed next. 
Based on the assumption that shifting ability would 
differ according to degree of market power, Song [1976] 
analyzed the shifting behavior of both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing corporations. In an attempt to address 
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previous criticisms of K-M's independent variable 
selection,30 Song's macro model was derived from a system of 
simultaneous equations that represents the structural 
relationship suggested by economic theory. 
The study covered the same period as the K-M analysis, 
as well as an extended period, 1934 to 1971. In assessing 
shifting for the entire corporate sector, and using the 
period covered by K-M, Song concluded that shifting was in 
the neighborhood of 87 percent. However, when applied only 
to the manufacturing sector, the results were nearly 
identical to that of K-M (130 percent to 134 percent). 
Shifting in the non-manufacturing industries was 
significantly less, 42 percent. The author considered the 
results to be consistent with the hypothesis that 
corporations with greater market power (manufacturing 
corporat1ons) have a greater ability to shift the tax' 
forward to consumers. 
30Although K-M [1963] state that they developed their 
equation through experimentation, they did provide a general 
macro system of which the single equation model is the 
reduced form. 
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When the analysis was extended to cover the period 
between 1934 and 1971, shifting for the entire corporate 
sector was only 25 percent (as compared to 87 percent noted 
above). In addition, Song found no evidence to support the 
contention that the tax had been shifted backward to labor. 
In a more detailed analysis of manufacturing companies, 
Bayer [1970] examined shifting by industry (by two-digit 
manufacturing SIC code), for the period from 1947 to 1963. 
Bayer's model was an extension of the original K-M [1963] 
model. His results indicated that no shifting had occurred 
in nine of the seventeen industries examined. Of the 
remaining eight, the author concluded that one shifted more 
than 100 percent of the tax and three others may have fully 
shifted the tax. Although not contrary to K-M's finding, 
per se, it is unlikely that the shifting noted in the nine 
industries was sufficient to infer average shifting greater 
than 100 percent. 
In a later study, Berry [1978] applied a modified K-M 
model in order to obtain disaggregate shifting data. His 
modifications included the introduction of two tax policy 
variables and a pressure variable. The purpose being to 
further separate the effects of changes in the tax rate from 
other tax policy effects. 
Berry's results showed that, for the time period 
between 1940 and 1974, 39 percent of the corporate tax 
burden had been shifted by the manufacturing sector as a 
whole. Of fourteen industries examined, six were able to 
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shift more than 100 percent of the tax burden. An analysis 
of market concentration ratios indicated that there was no 
positive relationship between market power and shifting 
behavior. 
Studies of the Life Insurance Industry 
In a study with a much narrower scope, Launie [1968] 
examined the incidence of the corporate tax as it relates to 
life insurance companies. The focus of the analysis was on 
the significant change in the tax treatment of life 
insurance companies brought about by the passage of "The 
Life Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959. 11 As a result of the 
act, the effective tax rate for life insurance companies was 
substantially increased. Launie applied a modified version 
of the K-M [1963] model. The study covered the period from 
1952 to 1965 and included a sample of 25 stock companies. 
His results were nearly identical to those obtained by K-M. 
The owners of capital did not bear any of the burden of the 
tax and overshifting seemed to have occurred. 
Launie's analysis was subsequently extended by 
Stagliano [1977]. Stagliano included both mutual and stock 
companies in his sample and expanded the time-frame to 
include the period between 1952 and 1974. Although 
obtain1ng slightly lower shifting results, he still 
concluded that life insurance companies were able to 
completely shift the burden of the tax. 
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In summary, rigorous econometric evaluation of the 
incidence of the corporate income tax has generally 
developed along two lines: factor shares analysis and rate 
of return analysis. Conclusions derived from the empirical 
research range along a continuum from no shifting to more 
than 100 percent shifting. The extent to which these 
studies provide evidence as to the distribution of the 
corporate tax burden, depends critically on their ability to 
isolate the tax effects from other factors bearing on the 
determination of corporate earnings. Given the myriad of 
factors that effect corporate profits, and the significant 
limitations of macro-economic theory, there is a con-
siderable risk of mistaking association for causation. 
Peacock [1969], in summarizing his review of the econometric 
studies of tax incidence, concluded that there was no reason 
to be optimistic concerning solutions to the aforementioned 
problems. 
Due partly to the econometric problems just discussed, 
simulation analysis has been offered as an alternative 
methodology in the study of tax incidence. Two such studies 
are discussed next. 
Analytical and Simulation Analysis 
It was the pioneering work of Harberger [1962] that 
first placed tax incidence analysis in a general equilibrium 
setting. The general framework of the model is a two sector 
(corporate and non-corporate) abstraction of a perfectly 
competitive market. The key assumptions are: 1) a Cobb-
Douglas production function exhibiting constant returns to 
scale, 2) two input factors (labor and capital) of varying 
mobility, 3) two output products, 4) homogenous consumers, 
and 5) fixed factor supplies. 
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Harberger treats the corporate tax as a partial factor 
tax and assumes that the short-run incidence is on the 
owners of corporate capital. Consequently, imposition of 
the tax results in a movement of capital from the corporate 
to the non-corporate sector. The analysis is carried out in 
terms of small changes in the tax rate so that the general 
equilibrium is differentiated with respect to the tax. To 
analyze the incidence of the tax, it is necessary to solve 
for the change in the after tax rate of return on capital, 
relative to the price of labor. If the fall in the net 
return to capital is equal to the tax proceeds, capital (in 
both sectors) will bear the entire burden of the tax. 
Using empirical estimates of key parameters, Harberger 
concluded that the owners of capital (corporate and non-cor-
porate) bear close to one-hundred percent of the burden of 
the corporate income tax. 
The Harberger model is not without substantial 
critic1sm. Perhaps the most important weakness is the 
assumption that the short-run burden of the tax is on the 
owners of capital. Recall that if the tax is shifted in the 
short-run, there will be no further adjustment in prices. 
Even in the absence of short-run shifting, there are 
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considerable qualifications to the theoretical results 
obtained by Harberger. 
Although Harberger•s [1962] two-sector abstraction of a 
perfectly competitive market keeps the analysis both 
conceptually and mathematically tractable, the simplifying 
assumptions can lead to misleading results. For example, a 
multisector approach may lead to significantly different in-
cidence estimates. In addition, the assumptions of fixed 
capital supply and perfectly mobile factors of production 
are somewhat peculiar in that the time involved for shifting 
capital between sectors is generally considered to be the 
same as the time involved for investment decisions. That 
is, the time for a change in the aggregate supply of capital 
[Stiglitz, 1988]. 
To address many of the criticisms of Harberger, Shaven 
and Whalley [1972] performed a general equilibrium 
simulation analysis of corporate tax incidence. Their 
simulation differed from Harberger•s analysis along two 
important lines. First, Shaven and Whalley incorporated two 
consumer groups, whereas Harberger assumed homogenous 
consumers. This modification allows the distributional 
effects of the tax on the uses side of the equation to be 
examined.31 More importantly, the Shaven and Whalley model 
is solved using an algorithmic approach which does not rely 
on differential calculus. This addresses a major criticism 
31Additional modifications included the use of a CES 
production function as opposed to Cobb-Douglas, and the 
inclusion of a labor/leisure choice. 
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of the Harberger model which uses a local analysis not well 
suited for distortions the size of the corporate income tax 
[approximately 50 percent]. Despite these differences, 
Shaven and Whalley obtained similar results when they 
applied their algorithmic model to the original Harberger 
data. 
In a later study, Shaven [1976] extended the 
algorithmic approach to include 12 productive sectors. 
Although there were considerable variations in the level of 
commodity price changes among industries within the 
corporate sector, the estimated shifting parameter remained 
unchanged.32 That is, the results indicate that the owners 
of capital in both the corporate and non-corporate sectors 
bear the burden of the tax. 
Although the previous models are theoretically more 
palatable than the original Harberger model, they are 
subject to several limitations.33 The most important of 
which seems to be the failure to consider the case of 
imperfectly competitive markets. By assumption, the short-
run incidence of the corporate tax rests with the owners of 
corporate capital. As was discussed in Chapter 3, there is 
considerable reason to doubt the validity of this 
assumption. As with the Harberger analysis, if the tax is 
32rt should be noted that Shaven [1976] and Shaven and 
Whalley [1972] obtain significantly larger welfare loss 
estimates using their algorithmic models. 
33For a more detailed discussion of the limitations of 
s1mulation analysis see Fullerton, Henderson and Shaven in 
chapter 9 of Scarf and Shaven [1984]. 
shifted in the short-run, the results of the simulation 
analysis become irrelevant. 
52 
In summary, the determination of the incidence of the 
corporate income tax has proven to be a formidable task. 
Most of the early empirical studies were defective in that 
they made no attempt to control for other economic factors 
affecting corporate earnings. Beginning in the nineteen 
sixties, attempts were made to develop a profit-behavior 
model and to use econometric techniques in the study of tax 
incidence. The models have tended to be very sensitive to 
the data examined and have generated conflicting and 
sometimes surprising results: shifting behavior ranging from 
zero to over 100 percent. Although more rigorous than 
earlier studies, the econometric analysis has been ques-
tioned on grounds that the tax effect has not been properly 
isolated. Finally, recent advances in computer technology 
have led to the development of large scale simulation models 
for studying tax incidence. However, the results depend 
critically on the short-run incidence of the tax being on 
the owners of corporate capital. 
Given the conflicting empirical results to date, it is 
clear that closure has not been reached on the question of 
who bears the burden of the corporate income tax. All 
previous models have been criticized for their inability to 
1solate the effects of the corporate tax on the rate of 
return on capital. Empirical results inconsistent with a 
particular view are simply dismissed as spurious 
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association. It is the purpose of this research to apply an 
alternative methodology which will establish a direct causal 
link between the imposition of the tax and the observed 
effect on the corporate rate of return. This methodology is 
described in Chapter v. 
CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
Before describing the methodology in detail, a point 
should be made about the reliance on market efficiency in 
the study of tax incidence. As Beaver [1972] notes, market 
efficiency does not imply clairvoyance. Ex ante bel1efs 
about shifting may or may not be realized. However, there 
are two reasons to believe that the market would make an 
accurate assessment of shifting, at least with respect to 
the short-run. First, the market should be aware of the 
favorable cond1tions for shifting that exist in the life 
insurance industry. More importantly, the market's 
assessment can be based on an analysis of recent increases 
in the effective corporate rate paid by life insurance 
companies. Between 1948 and 1953 the life insurance 
industries effective corporate tax rate rose from zero to 26 
percent. In the next four years corporate taxes increased 
46 percent and life insurance companies were paying an 
effect1ve rate of 38 percent [Whitman and Thompson, 1968]. 
G1ven the substantial increases in the effective corporate 
tax rate, it is unlikely that short-run shifting would go 
undetected by the market. 
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Since an events study methodology is to be applied in 
this research, tax incidence needs to be addressed in the 
context of its affect on stock prices. This is presented in 
the following section. 
Shifting and Its Impact on Stock Prices: 
Theoretical Considerations 
Recall that, under a partial-equilibrium tax incidence 
framework, the elasticity of supply of capital and the elas-
ticity of demand for capital are sufficient for determining 
the incidence of the tax. The elasticity of demand for 
capital is determined by the demand for life insurance, the 
ease with which labor may be substituted for capital within 
the industry (elasticity of substitution), the share of 
capital in the production process, and the elasticity of 
labor. The elasticity of the supply of capital is 
determined by the consumer's time preferences and the 
savings rate. The savings rate is a direct function of the 
interest rate. 
There are two polar cases where shifting estimates may 
be determined based solely on the elasticity of supply of 
capital in the insurance industry. These are: (1) a 
perfectly inelastic supply of capital, in which the owners 
of capital will bear the entire burden of the tax, and (2) a 
perfectly elastic supply of capital, where the entire burden 
is shifted to either consumers or labor. It is the former 
case that is generally considered descriptive of short-run 
56 
operations. Therefore, theoretically, the short-run 
incidence of the life insurance tax will be on the owners of 
capital. 
In the longer-run, and absent a perfectly elastic 
supply of capital, shifting estimates will depend on both 
the elasticities of supply of capital and demand for 
capital. Unfortunately, empirical estimates of long-run 
elasticities in the service industry are virtually non-
existent. As a result, a sensitivity analysis was performed 
for alternative elasticities and time-frames. 
Perhaps the major contribut1on of this research is the 
extent to which it provides corroborative evidence for the 
prior econometric studies in this area. Both Stagliano 
[1977] and Launie [1968] concluded that the owners of 
capital in the insurance industry bore none of the corporate 
tax burden. Their results indicated that the tax had been 
fully sh1fted 1n the short-run:34 a result which is in 
direct conflict with traditional tax incidence theory. 
The importance of this point cannot be overstated. It 
is the short-run burden of the tax that drives all of the 
longer-run movements suggested by theory. Although the 
long-run shifting estimates may be less definitive, the 
current methodology should provide strong evidence as to the 
occurrence of 100 percent short-run shifting. 
34In fact, Launie's results imply that the owners of 
capital actually benefited from the increase in the 
corporate tax. A $1.00 increase in the tax seemed to 
generate a $1.50 increase in income before taxes. 
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Implications for Stock Price Behavior 
Before considering the question of shifting directly, a 
brief discussion of the effect of taxes on firm value will 
be presented. Using the analytical framework of Miller and 
Modigliani [1963], a firm will be valued at the discounted 
present value of the expected future cash flows. Absent 
debt financing and the corporate income tax, the stock price 
may be determined with the following formula: 
P· = J 
where: 
Pj =the price of firm j; 
E[Xj] =the expected annual future cash flows; and 
ik = the risk adjusted rate of return required on 
any firm in class k. 
Introducing the corporate income tax is a relatively 
straight forward process. The expected cash flows (E[X]) 
are simply replaced with expected after-tax cash flows 
N 
(1) 
(E[X]). Provided that the tax reduces expected cash flows, 
there should be a decline in the stock price. Using the 
terminology of Beaver [1981], the imposition of the tax will 
cause a decline in permanent earnings which decreases the 
firm's future div1dend paying ability. The extent of the 
decline in permanent earnings is clearly dependent on the 
firm's ability to shift the tax. If the burden is fully 
shifted in the short-run, as the results of Launie [1971] 
58 
and Stagliano [1977] suggest, cash flows will be unaffected 
N 
by the imposition of the tax (i.e., E[X] = E[X])35. As a 
result, there should be no stock price response to the 
legislative action.36 
A simple example showing the affects of shifting on 
stock returns may be helpful. Let 
E[XJ = $10; and 
ik = .035. 
Using model (1), the value of the company at time zero (Po) 
would be: 
$10 
Po = ------- = $285.71 
.035 
If a 40 percent tax is subsequently imposed on corporate 
profits, and no short-run or long-run shifting occurs, the 
value of the company will drop 40 percent. The calculations 
are as follows: 
$10(1 - .40) 
p1 = --------------- = $171.43 
.035 
35rf the firm uses debt financing, after-tax cash flows 
need not rise to the level that would have existed in the 
absence of the tax in order to obtain full shifting. This 
is because the tax shield of debt rises as the tax rate increases. 
36since little opportunity exists to shift the 
retroactive portion of the 1959 Act, a stock price reaction 
might still be expected. However, using model 2 (see page 
60) to estimate the price effect of the change, the 
predicted stock price reaction would be less than one-half 
of one percent. 
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285.71 - 171.43 
p = ------------------- = <.40> 
285.71 
Recall, however, that Launie's [1968] and Stagliano's [1977] 
econometric studies indicated that after-tax profits were 
totally unaffected by the increased corporate tax burden. 
This implies that insurance companies were able to make 
short-run adjustments in premium prices andjor sales 
commissions which allowed complete short-run shifting. In 
terms of model (1), pre-tax profits would rise to $16.67 
and, as shown below, the increased corporate tax burden 
would cause no change in firm value. 
$16.67(1 - .4) 
P1 = = $285.71 =Po 
.035 
Therefore, a test of the results of prior econometric 
studies (full short-run shifting) leads to the following 
hypothesis (stated in the null form): 
Ho: Stock prices will be unaffected by the passage of 
the Life Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959. 
In the absence of 100 percent short-run shifting, the 
effect of debt financing must be considered in the analysis. 
This is because the value of debt will be capitalized at a 
lower certainty rate than the rate for uncertain streams 
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[Miller and Modigliani, 1963].37 When debt financing is 
used, firm value will be determined as follows: 
(2) 
ik - t(ik - r) * D/V 
where: 
r = the interest rate on the debt instrument: 
D/V = the debt to firm value ratio: 
t = the marginal corporate tax rate: 
and other variables are as defined earlier in this section. 
Recall that, if the short-run burden of the tax is on 
the owners of capital, there will be a tax-induced movement 
of capital out of the insurance industry. The magnitude of 
the movement, and therefore the extent of the shifting, will 
depend on the long-run elasticities of supply and demand for 
capital. Because empirical estimates of these parameters 
are unavailable, several alternative shifting assumptions 
will be considered (see Table I). 
Another important factor that must be considered is the 
time frame necessary to go from a pre-tax to a post-tax 
equilibrium. As discussed in Chapter III, the adjustment 
process may be quite lengthy. It is estimated that one-half 
of the adjustment may be completed with1n 20 to 30 years 
with equilibrium being reached in roughly 140 years 
[Feldstein, 1974: Sato, 1963]. However, their estimates are 
37Although life insurance companies rarely issue 
outside debt, the obligations for future benefit payments 
have many of the same characteristics [Launie, 1971]. 
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based on an analysis of the entire corporate sector, whereas 
the 1959 Act affects only a single industry. Since the 
insurance industry experienced rapid growth in the 1950's,38 
the adjustment process may be shorter than that suggested by 
Feldstein and Sato. Therefore, two alternative time frames 
are considered in this study: 30 years and 140 years.39 
The 140-year period is treated in a manner consistent 
with the results obtained by Feldstein [1974]. One-half of 
the adjustment process will be considered to have been 
completed within the first 20 years. Of the remaining 
adjustment, one-half will be completed within the next 20 
years and equilibrium will be reached in an additional 100 
years. For the 30-year period, it is assumed that one-half 
of the adjustment will be completed within 10 years and the 
remaining adjustment within the next 20 years. 
The predicted declines in stock price under the various 
shifting and time-frame assumptions are presented in Table 
I. The pre-change and post-change effective tax rates and 
the debtjvalue ratio are calculated from data on the firms 
in the sample. Although actual data is used, sufficient 
information should have been available to investors to make 
reasonable estimates of the ultimate tax liability to be 
imposed under the 1959 Act. 
38Life insurance in force rose 150 percent in the 
1950's and the number of life insurance companies grew from 
600 to nearly 1300 during this same period [Weinrel, 1959]. 
39A third alternative, 60 years, was considered but the 
estimated effects on stock prices were not substantially 
different from those obtained using the 140 year period. 
TABLE I 
PREDICTED DECLINE IN STOCK PRICE! 
Long-run Time-frame 
Shifting 
----------
Assumed 30-year 140-year 
--------- --------- ---------
100% 5.02% 8.66% 
75% 7.67% 10.46% 
50% 10.32% 12.25% 
25% 12.98% 14.04% 
0% 15.63% 15.63% 
!calculated using a modified version of equation (2) and 
the following parameters: 
ik = 3.5% 
r = 3.0% (Launie, 1971] 
D/V = 51. 3%40 
Pre-change effective rate = .158 
Post-change effective rate = .297 
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Notice that, contrary to the results of full short-run 
shifting, if the tax is fully shifted in the long-run, a 
stock price reaction would still be expected to occur. This 
is because the owners of capital will bear the burden of the 
tax until the adjustment process is complete. Even given 
40D represents the obligation for future benefit 
payments as reported on the December 31, 1958 financial 
statements. 
the conservative estimate of 30 years to reach long-run 
equilibrium, the predicted stock price decline is 5.02 
percent. Therefore, the methodology applied in this study 
should be sensitive enough to distinguish between 100 
percent short-run shifting and 100 percent long-run 
shifting. 
Research Design and Related 
Accounting Literature 
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The stock price reaction to a regulatory change 
announcement will be the product of the revision in the 
market's probability assessment that the change will be 
implemented and the expected magnitude of the present value 
of the cash flow effect. If the researcher is able to 
determine all of the relevant event dates, the market 
reaction will represent the entire stockholder wealth effect 
of the legislative action. In terms of tax incidence, the 
price reaction will show the market's assessment of the 
amount of the tax burden remaining on the stockholders of 
the company. Shifting will have occurred to the extent that 
the expected present value of federal tax revenues differs 
from the observed stockholder wealth effect. 
Since tax law changes are the result of a political 
process, the isolation of relevant event dates is extremely 
difficult. A lengthy deliberation period, in which the 
market may assess the economic impact of the legislation, 
invariably precedes enactment. However, recent 
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methodological refinements by Madeo and Pincus [1985] and 
Manegold and Karlinsky [1988] have greatly improved the 
ability to measure the stockholder wealth effects of tax law 
changes. 
Madeo and Pincus examined the market's reaction to the 
Internal Revenue Services' issuance of Revenue Procedure 80-
55. The regulatory action, which was retroactively applied, 
eliminated the deductibility of interest paid on government 
time deposits which were collateralized by tax exempt 
securities. Extending a methodology developed in Shipper 
and Thompson [1983], the authors used the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) approach to confirm an expected 
negative market reaction to the disallowance of the interest 
deduction. No attempt was made to address the possibility 
of shifting in that only the retroactive portion of the 
change was examined. 
Manegold and Karlinsky [1988] also applied the SUR 
approach in their study of the market's reaction to certain 
possessions corporation tax changes included in the Tax 
Equity and Responsibility Act of 1982. The major 
contribution of their study was the separate identification 
of a deliberation effect and an announcement date effect 
related to the regulatory change. Although not addressing 
the question of shifting, the authors did compare a market-
based revenue estimate with that provided by the Treasury. 
The market-based estimate was smaller than that of the 
Treasury. However, the sample did not include all of the 
companies affected by the change and the market-based 
estimate included only three announcement dates. 
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Due to the differing focus of this research, two 
additional issues need to be addressed. First, a major 
reason that the 1959 Act was chosen for study was that it 
did not contain other tax policy changes that might produce 
confounding effects on stock prices. However, the 1959 Act 
was expected to shift a portion of the relative federal tax 
burden from mutual companies to stock companies [Joint 
Conferences Committee Report, 1959]. As a result, not only 
will stock companies be facing an increasing tax burden, but 
it will be greater than that incurred by their competitors. 
At first glance, it would seem that stock company stock 
prices would decline for two reasons: (1) an increased tax 
burden, and (2) a loss in competitive position to the mutual 
companies. Nevertheless, it is argued that any decline in 
stock company prices is still a direct result of the 
inability to shift the tax burden. The reasoning is as 
follows: 
First, if neither group of companies responds to the 
tax increase, their relative market share will remain un-
changed. However, the failure to shift the tax will cause 
after-tax profits to decline and stock prices to fall. 
Alternatively, stock companies might try to recover the tax 
by raising their premium prices. If mutual companies follow 
suit, and demand does not fall, after-tax profits will be 
unaffected by the increased tax and no stock price response 
would be expected. If mutual companies do not raise their 
prices, stock companies will lose market share and profits 
will fall. The result will be a decrease in stock company 
stock prices. Therefore, all stock price reactions to the 
tax law change are driven by the ability, or lack thereof, 
of the insurance companies to shift the tax burden (either 
through increased premium prices or through reduced wage 
rates) . 
The second issue stems from the fact that all of the 
firms in the sample are Over-The-Counter (OTC) stocks. 
Although market efficiency in the semi-strong form is well 
established for the New York ~tock Exchange (NYSE), some 
question may be raised as to the efficiency of smaller 
exchanges [Dyckman and Morse, 1975]. 
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Research to date has generated conflicting results on 
this issue. In a study covering the period from 1973 to 
1976, Morse [1981] detected significant price adjustments on 
days following quarterly earnings announcements. Although 
not testing for the existence of a trading strategy that 
could obtain abnormal returns, he concluded that it takes 
the market several days to process the information: a 
result inconsistent with semi-strong form market efficiency. 
In another study, Brown [1988] examined the stock price 
reaction to firms changing their depreciation policies. In 
assessing market efficiency, he concluded that the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the OTC markets were not as 
efficient as the NYSE. 
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On the other hand, the empirical results of Grant 
[1980], Osborne [1982], and Foster [1975] are generally 
consistent with the semi-strong form of market efficiency 
for the OTC market.41 The most important of these studies, 
with respect to this research, is that performed by Foster 
[1975]. Foster examined the price reactions of insurance 
stocks to annual earnings announcements for the period from 
1965 to 1971. In assessing market efficiency, he concluded 
that the OTC market appears to be semi-strong form efficient 
for insurance stocks. 
Sample Selection and Confounding Events 
Sample Selection. The following data availability 
requirements were necessary for inclusion in the sample. 
First, only those stock companies listed in the 1960 Best's 
Flitcraft Compend were selected for study. The 1960 Compend 
contained a listing of 256 life insurance companies (stock 
and mutual) which, taken together, wrote over 99 percent of 
the life insurance in force in the United States. Of the 
companies listed in Best's, 96 were eliminated from the 
sample because they were mutuals and 36 were eliminated 
because they were wholly-owned subsidiaries. This left 124 
compan1es meeting requirement one. 
The second requirement was that complete data on stock 
prices, dividends and capital changes had to be available 
41Hagerman and Richmond [1973], Mampe [1974] and Reilly 
and Slaughter [1973] have reported results consistent with 
weak-form efficiency for the OTC market. 
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for the entire period under study. During this period, life 
insurance companies were traded almost exclusively on the 
OTC market. As a result, stock price data could only be 
obtained from two sources: the National Underwriter (NU) 
and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Complete weekly 
(Friday's closing price) stock price data were obtained for 
32 companies from the WSJ. The WSJ published stock prices 
for the National, Eastern and Weekly OTC listings. Tuesday 
stock price data were obtained for an additional 7 companies 
from the NU. The NU reported weekly prices on 30 life 
insurance stocks which they consider to be of widespread 
interest to their readers. 
Confounding Events. The Wall Street Journal, National 
Underwriters, and The Weekly Underwriter were the sources 
used to identify confounding events. Significant 
confounding events took the form of large mergers and the 
issuance of substantial blocks of stock. From the group of 
companies meeting the data availability requirements, two 
were eliminated from the sample due to large mergers 
(greater than 5% of total assets) and one was eliminated 
from the sample due to the issuance of a large block of new 
shares. This left a final sample of 36 insurance companies 
(see Table II) of which Friday returns were obtained for 29 
companies and Tuesday returns for 7 companies. 
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TABLE II 
LIST OF SAMPLE FIRMS 
No. Company Name 
1 Aetna Life Insurance Company 
2 American National Insurance Company 
3 Bankers National Life Insurance Company 
4 Beneficial Standard Life Insurance Company 
5 Business Mens Assurance 
6 California Western States Life Insurance 
Company 
7 Commonwealth ~ife Insurance Company 
8 Connecticut General Life Insurance Company 
9 Continental Assurance Company 
10 Franklin Life Insurance Company 
11 Government Employees Life Insurance Company 
12 Great Southern Life Insurance Company 
13 Gulf Life Insurance Company 
14 Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company 
15 Kansas City Life Insurance Company 
16 Liberty National Life Insurance Company 
17 Life & Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee 
18 Life Companies 
19 Life Insurance Company of Virginia 
20 Lincoln National Life Insurance Company 
21 Monumental Life Insurance Company 
22 National Life and Accident Insurance Company 
23 National Security Life Insurance Company 
24 North American Life Insurance Company of 
Illinois 
25 Northwest National Life Insurance Company 
26 Ohio State Life Insurance Company 
27 Philadelphia Life Insurance Company 
28 Republic National Life Insurance Company 
29 Skyland Life Insurance Company 
30 Southwestern Life Insurance Company 
31 Standard Union Life Insurance Company 
32 The Old Line Life Insurance Company of America 
33 The United States Life Insurance Company of 
New York 
34 Travelers Life Insurance Company 
35 United Insurance Company of America 
36 Wisconsin National Life Insurance Company 
At this point, a note as to the external validity of 
the study should be made. Random sampling is generally 
considered a necessary condition for extension of the 
results beyond the specific sample of the study. However, 
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due to data availability requirements, randomization was not 
practical. As a result, the companies included in the 
sample tend to be much larger and more widely held than the 
population of life insurance companies as a whole. 
Consequently, extension of the results of this study to the 
entire industry and generalization to the companies not 
included in the study should be cautiously applied. 
Event Dates 
If the entire economic effect of the 1959 Act is to be 
determined, identification of relevant event dates will be 
of critical importance. To this end, the Wall Street 
Journal Index, Prentice-Hall Weekly Tax Reports, The Weekly 
Underwriter and the National Underwriters were examined. 
The National Underwriters and The Weekly Underwriter are 
weekly trade journals which give detailed coverage of the 
life insurance industry. Included in these publications 
were reports from the joint tax committee of the American 
Life Convention and the Life Insurance Association of 
America (ALC-LIAA).42 Presumably, the tax committee had the 
best access to information concerning the probability of 
42The ALC-LIAA is comprised of chief executives of most 
of the u.s. based life insurance companies. 
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passage of any legislation and the ultimate tax burden that 
would be imposed. 
The relevant legislative dates related to the passage 
of The Life Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959 are presented 
in Table III. 
TABLE III 
LEGISLATIVE EVENT DATES! 
Event Dates Description 
11/17/58 - 11/20/58 House Ways and Means Deliberation 
Hearings 
3/ 3/59 -
3/17/59 -
5/19/59 
3/ 5/59 
3/19/59 
Senate Finance Deliberation Hearings 
Senate Floor Debate and Passage 
6/ 9/59 - 6/10/59 Joint Conference Committee Report and 
House and Senate Acceptance of 
Report 
1congressional Record, 1958 and 1959. 
Certain legislative dates were eliminated from the 
model because either: (1) they had been made publicly 
available at an earlier date, or (2) no significant change 
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in the probability of passage or the amount of the burden to 
be imposed was expected to occur. 
During the period noted above, daily legislative 
updates were reported by the Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc. in its Daily Tax Report (BNA Tax Report).43 Although 
unable to obtain access to these reports, it is assumed that 
the contents of the above meetings and reports were made 
publicly available on a timely basis. 
Significant news announcements from the various 
journals are presented in Table IV. The information from 
the weekly trade journals was considered to be made publicly 
available on the Monday and Tuesday following the 
publication date. Discussions with both circulation 
departments revealed that the publications were mailed on 
Fridays and only sold by subscription. A review of these 
news releases highlights the importance of examining 
alternative sources in determining appropriate event dates. 
For example, the National Underwriter reported the details 
of Treasury Release A-13 a full ten days prior to its 
official public release. Only those releases that were 
considered to convey new information to investors were 
included in Table IV. 
43The BNA Tax Report reflects the previous day's news 
events [Madeo and Pincus, 1985). 
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TABLE IV 
NEWS RELEASE EVENT DATES 
Event Week Description 
9/16/57 - 9/17/57 NU - Reported that Treasury has a new 
formula for taxing LIC's. No details 
known and not expected to affect 1957. 
10/ 7/57 - 10/11/57 ALC Annual Meeting - Current rumors are 
that a permanent tax plan will be 
proposed early next year and will be 
based on the general corporate formula 
where a 52% rate prevails. 
11/10/57 - 11/14/57 LIAMA Annual Meeting - Indications are 
that a reversion to the 1942 law is 
possible and that Treasury is working 
on a permanent method for the industry. 
12/17/57 - 12/18/57 NU - Treasury has presented 
permanent proposal to HW&M. 
that tax base will be total 
approach. 
its 
Reported 
income 
1/ 9/58 - 1/10/58 WSJ - Treasury is said to be ready to 
unveil a full income approach. 
3/31/58 - 4/ 1/58 NU - Reported that the Treasury plan 
would use net gain from operations 
after dividends as the tax base. 
Probably would be a 3 to 5 year transi-
tion period. 
ALC-LIAA held a special meeting to 
consider strategy in reaction to the 
Treasury's proposal. 
4/14/58 - 4/15/58 NUl - A very general description of the 
alternatives being considered by the 
Treasury. General feeling is that the 
importance of the life insurance 
industry to the general economy should 
prevent any drastic changes by Treasury 
[ALC-LIAA Special Tax Committee). 
However, it is possible that the tax 
liability could rise to $500 million. 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Event Week Description 
10/20/58 - 10/21/58 NU - Discussions with HW&M tax writers 
in the previous week indicate that they 
favor a total income approach. May 
face 52% of operating income. 
11/25/58 - 11/26/58 WSJ - HW&M agrees to last minute 
Treasury compromise; estimated 1958 
revenues are between $400 and $450 
million. 
12/ 8/58 - 12/ 9/58 NU - Leaks from the tax writing 
committe'e indicate a tax liability 
between $425 and $475 million. Total 
income approach is likely. 
1/26/59 - 1/27/59 NU - HW&M is reported to have completed 
work and will recommend a bill 
generating $500 million in revenues. 
WU - Joint tax committee of the ALC-
LIAA sent a draft of HW&M report to 
members. 
2/ 2/59 - 2/ 3/59 NU - Only thing that seems certain is 
the intent to collect $500 million in 
revenues. 
2/ 4/59 - 2/ 5/59 WSJ - HW&M tentatively approved part of 
proposal. Several LIC's reported to 
have set aside substantial reserves for 
new tax. 
2/ 6/59 - 2/ 7/59 WSJ - HW&M approves increase to $540 
million. 
2/ 9/59 - 2/10/59 NUl - Senate may increase tax liability 
to $600 million annually. 
WSJ - HW&M formally approves bill. 
PH - Details of HW&M's proposal are 
given. 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Event Week Description 
4/13/59 - 4/14/59 WSJ - SFC reduces liability to $500 
million. Companies average investment 
rate will be used to calculate reserve 
deductions. 
4/20/59 - 4/24/59 SFC - Ordered bill reported with amend-
ments. Not available for two weeks but 
major changes are disclosed. 
5/25/59 - 5/26/59 NU - Joint Conferences Committee not 
expected to make major changes to 
Senate passed bill. 
NU - National Underwriter 
WSJ - Wall Street Journal 
PH - Prentice Hall Federal Tax Report Bulletin 
WU - The Weekly Underwriter 
1Also reported in The Weekly Underwriter. 
Return Generating Process 
The model used to determine the economic effect of the 
1959 Act (and the extent of shifting) is developed in the 
following section. Unlike the traditional market model 
approach (Fama, et al, 1969; Brown and Warner, 1980), this 
study uses a model which combines the estimation period and 
event period into a single run. Therefore, the focus of the 
analysis is on parameter estimates rather than abnormal 
returns. 
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Firm Specific Variables. Parameter estimates for firm 
specific variables were obtained from a multi-index version 
of the market model [Sharpe, 1970]. This model is a 
description of the stochastic process generating security 
returns in the life insurance industry. The relationship 
can be written as 
where: 
Rit = return on stock of firm i in week t; 
Rmt = market return in week t; 
It = industry return in week t; 
A· l. = intercept for firm i. 
The returns are operationally defined as: 
Rit = [(Pit+ Dit)/Pit-1] - 1 and 
Rmt = (Mt/Mt-1)-1; 
where: 
(3) 
Pit = price of stock44 of firm i in week t adjusted for 
stock splits and stock dividends; 
Dit = the dividend for firm i in week t; 
Mt = the Standard and Poors 500 Composite Stock Price 
Index. 
In addition to controlling for economy-wide 
commonalities (Rmt), a control variable for industry-wide 
commonalities (It) was added to the traditional market 
44consistent with most prior research, the closing bid 
price will be used to calculate individual stock returns 
[Morse, 1981; Brown, 1988; Grant, 1980; Osborne, 1982; 
Foster, 1975]. 
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model. The industry index was included in the study in 
light of the results of Foster [1975]. Unlike prior studies 
[King, 1966 and Meyers, 1972], Foster found that the 
industry index explained a large portion of the variance of 
insurance company returns. 
The industry index was calculated in the same manner as 
Foster's industry index. This was done by first regressing 
an industry return (Rit> on the market return (Rmt> for the 
period covered by the study. The industry return was 
calculated (assuming equal weighting) from the firms in the 
sample. The residuals (et) from the first-stage regression 
were then used as the industry index in equation (3). The 
model was as follows: 
(4) 
(5) 
This method of orthogonalization guaranteed that the 
industry index was not capturing any of the market-wide 
commonalities (Rmt>· Separate indexes were constructed for 
the subsamples of Friday and Tuesday returns. 
Common Variable. In order to isolate the economic 
effect of the 1959 Act, a common variable was added to model 
(3). This common variable was designed to capture the 
legislative period effects and the news release period 
effects described in Tables II and III, respectively. It 
was as follows: 
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ECONt = dummy variable for legislative events and news 
announcement events. 
The ECON variable consisted of a set of dummy variables 
which were turned on during the week containing any event 
date. Values were set to zero during non-event date weeks. 
The following model was applied in stage one of the 
analysis. The model was estimated for the 36 companies in 
the sample for the period between July 12, 1957 and June 12, 
1959, 100 trading weeks. The estimates of the parameters of 
equation (6) were derived from a time-series OLS regression. 
(6) 
The focus of the analysis was on the coefficient of the 
ECON variable. If full short-run shifting had occurred, the 
coefficient should not have been significantly different 
from zero. In the absence of full short-run shifting, the 
sign of '( should have been negative and a one tail test 
appropriate. 
The second stage of the analysis would have been 
performed if the null hypothesis of full short-run shifting 
had been rejected (i.e., a statistically significant 
negative )/ ) • Stage two would have required an estimate of 
the decline in f~rm value caused by the 1959 Act. This 
estimate could then have been compared to the predicted 
declines in firm value under the various shifting and time 
frame assumptions detailed in Table I. 
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Statistical Assumptions 
Results of the cross-sectional regression model 
described in the previous section will be used to draw 
inferences about the economic burden of the corporate income 
tax in the life insurance industry. For the conclusions to 
be valid, certain assumptions underlying the OLS estimation 
technique need to be satisfied. Although the OLS estimation 
technique is generally considered robust to deviations in 
the underlying assumptions, both contemporaneous correlation 
and autocorrelation have been identified as possibly having 
serious effects on hypothesis testing in events studies 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). 
In the current study, as with most regulatory change 
studies, event time and calender time were identical for all 
firms in the sample. In addition, the entire sample was 
clustered within a single industry. As a result, 
significant interdependencies (contemporaneous correlation) 
are likely to exist between the unexpected returns of the 
firms in the sample [Collins and Dent, 1984]. When contem-
poraneous correlation is present, the ordinary-least-squares 
(OLS) estimator will not yield reliable parameter estimates. 
To account for this condition, prior regulatory impact 
studies have used the SUR technique to obtain parameter 
estimates. However, when the SUR technique is applied, only 
asymptotic properties are available. In addition, OLS 
estimators are more efficient than SUR estimators in the 
absence of significant contemporaneous correlation. 
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To determine the appropriate estimator, a Lagrangian 
Multiplier (LM) statistic was calculated to test for the 
existence of significant contemporaneous correlation. The 
LM statistic indicated that contemporaneous correlation was 
not a problem. Therefore, the OLS estimation technique was 
applied in this study. 
To test for the presence of autocorrelation, a Durbin-
Watson (OW) statistic for first order auto correlation of 
the error terms was calculated for each company in the 
sample. Although some autocorrelation was indicated, 
alternative estimation techniques which account for the 
autocorrelation yielded results nearly identical with those 
obtained using OLS. Summary statistics are presented in the 
following chapter. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the methodology for exploring the 
extent of the shifting of the corporate income tax of life 
insurance companies in an efficient capital markets has been 
described. The hypothesis which relates the passage of The 
Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 with security 
returns, was tested using a modified multi-index version of 
the market model. The results are presented in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER VI 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS 
This chapter reports the results of the data analysis. 
After discussing some diagnostics, the results of the stock 
return tests using equation (4) are presented. In addition, 
alternative models are employed as a method of validating 
the results from the initial test. 
Data Analysis 
Diagnostics 
To draw inferences from regression results, the 
assumptions underlying the estimation technique should be 
satisfied. Recall that the OLS estimator is fully efficient 
when the variancejcovariance matrix is diagonal (no 
contemporaneous correlation). However, when event dates are 
clustered and when there exists a significant degree of 
industry concentration, the assumption of independence of 
error terms may be violated. 
To test for the existence of significant 
contemporaneous correlation, the Lagrangian Multiplier test 
was performed. The LM statistic for testing the null 
hypothesis of a diagonal variance/covariance matrix (i.e., 
no contemporaneous correlation) is given by 
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(7) 
where r·. lJ 
~ ij 
= ----------.::. 4 ~ ii ~ jj 
and ~ij = (Yi-Xibi) '(Yj-Xjbj)· Under the null hypothesis, 
;i LM has an asymptotic X 2 [M(M-1)/2] distribution. Note 
that M(M - 1)/2 is half the number of off-diagonal elements 
in f and is equal to the number of firms in the sample. ~ 
is the covariance matrix of the joint disturbance vector. 
[Judge, et al, 1985]. 
The results of the Lagrangian Multiplier Test indicate 
that no significant correlation existed between the 
unexpected returns of the firms in the sample. Using a 10 
percent significance level, the LM test statistic (27.9689) 
was not sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis of 
a diagonal variancejcovariance matrix. Therefore, the OLS 
estimation technique was used to obtain the parameter 
estimates for equation (6). 
Another potential problem with time-series data is the 
existence of autocorrelation. Autocorrelation exists when 
the disturbance terms corresponding to different 
observations are correlated [Judge, et al, 1985]. Under 
this condition, OLS parameter estimates are not efficient 
and the standard errors used for hypothesis testing are 
biased. To test for significant first-order 
autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated 
for each regression run. The null hypothesis of no positive 
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autocorrelation was rejected for 3 companies and 
inconclusive for an additional 6 companies. The null 
hypothesis of no negative autocorrelation was rejected for 2 
companies and was inconclusive for 1 more. 
To insure that the autocorrelation was not driving the 
initial test results, alternative estimation techniques were 
applied to the 12 companies just mentioned. These results 
are reported in a later section of this chapte~. However, 
there were no major differences in the results between the 
OLS estimators and the estimators which adjusted for the 
autocorrelation. 
Regression Estimates 
To test for the existence of full short-run shifting, 
OLS regressions were run for the 36 companies in the sample 
using equation (6). Cross sectional statistics are 
presented in Table V. Consistent with the Foster (1974) 
study, the industry variable explains a large portion of the 
variation of a company's weekly security rate of return. 
The average R2 increases from 5.1 percent to 20.7 ,percent 
when the industry variable is included in the model. 
However, in the Foster study, a much larger portion of the 
company's variation in rate of return was explained when the 
industry variable was added to the standard market model 
(47.7% vs. 20.7%). In addition, the average Beta reported 
by Foster (1.056) was much larger than that estimated during 
the time period of this study (.4562). 
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TABLE V 
CROSS-SECTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRICE REGRESSION STATISTICS 
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 
(including (industry 
$ industry variable A 6 variable) suppressed) 
Mean 0.0014 0.4562 0.9834 0.2065 0.0513 
Std. Error 0.0019 0.3025 0.4116 0.1144 0.0257 
In Table VI, parameter estimates of the intercept and 
control variables for each company in the sample are 
presented. In addition, the DW statistic for each 
regression run is included in Table VI. Adjustments for 
significant first-order autocorrelation are reported later 
in this chapter. Note that nearly all of the estimated 
Betas are below 1.00. This indicates that insurance stocks 
are less risky than stocks on average. Given the market 
setting in which insurance companies operate, the low beta 
is not surprising. 
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TABLE VI 
COMPANY SPECIFIC PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
Company A Std. 
..tJ Std. c5 Std. No. Error Error Error 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
-0.0021 0.003 0.98771a 0.202 0.76251a 0.223 
-0.0005 0.003 0.14170 0.205 1.19522a 0.227 
-0.0015 0.003 0.42941a 0.218 o.72620a 0.241 
-0.0000 0.003 0.18723 0.228 1. 52989a 0.252 
0.0044a 0.001 0.19528a 0.111 0.41617a 0.123 
0.0028 0.002 0.17152 0.115 0.57336a 0.132 
0.0027 0.003 0.73859a 0.206 1.19380a 0.228 
0.0015 0.002 0.77705a 0.167 1.24867a 0.185 
0.0018 0.003 0.91444a 0.211 1.15368a 0.233 
0.0010 0.003 0.82208a 0.223 1.33494a 0.247 
0.0012 0.004 0.81357a 0.264 0.89988a 0.292 
0.0016 0.002 0.11911 0.102 0.33077a 0.116 
-0.0030 0.003 1.04614a 0.218 1.44840a 0.242 
-0.0032 0.002 0.62653a 0.166 0.78809a 0.183 
-0.0000 0.002 0.39699a 0.148 0.90131a 0.164 
0.0049 0.004 0.34161 0.224 1.11843a 0.248 
0.0010 0.003 0.32741 0.209 1.44235a 0.231 
0.0033 0.005 0.45949 0.286 1. 50646a 0.316 
0.0009 0.003 0.47237a 0.179 0.78292a 0.198 
-0.0034 0.003 0.97126a 0.161 1.28051a 0.178 
0.0003 0.003 0.38237a 0.157 0.55183a 0.173 
0.0001 0.003 0.46877a 0.181 0.94959a 0.199 
0.0058 0.005 0.05130 0.343 0.84431a 0.379 
-0.0021 0.004 0.19848 0.173 0.88207a 0.199 
0.0029 0.002 0.12130 0.151 0.38637a 0.167 
0.0041 0.004 0.47455a 0.201 1.4987oa 0.230 
0.0058 0.005 0.51143a 0.309 0.90858a 0.342 
0.0078a 0.003 0.26514 0.169 0.64107a 0.187 
0.0042 0.004 0.23593 0.296 0.46004 0.296 
0.0028 0.002 0.27265a 0.119 0.34308a 0.131 
-0.0050 0.005 0.22558 0.302 1.09285a 0.335 
0.0015 0.003 0.14114 0.142 0.80791a 0.163 
0.0030 0.004 1.10214a 0.242 1.59009a 0.268 
-0.0000 0.002 0.66065a 0.138 0.90379a 0.152 
0.0053 0.005 0.08914 0.263 2.17892a 0.301 
0.0001 0.004 0.28121 0.196 0.72875a 0.225 
asignificant at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 
bsignificant positive autocorrelation, .05 level. 
csignificant negative autocorrelation, .05 level. 
dow test inconclusive. 
ow 
Stat. 
1.797 
1.699d 
1.886 
2.148 
1.797 
2.250 
2.148 
2.078 
1.885 
1.957 
1.914 
1.956 
1. 639d 
1.902 
1. 397b 
1. 603b 
1.918 
1.757 
2.097 
1.740d 
1.487b 
1.881 
2.449c 
2.056 
2.158 
1.860 
2.047 
1. 645d 
1.740d 
2.010 
2.648c 
2.209 
1.721d 
2.307d 
1.894 
2.086 
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Analysis of Full Short-run Shifting 
The first hypothesis tests for the existence of full 
short-run shifting of the increased federal corporate tax 
burden levied under The Life Insurance Company Income Tax 
Act of 1959. If the tax is fully shifted in the short-run, 
life insurance company after-tax cash flows should be 
unaffected by the 1959 Act. Consequently, no stock price 
reaction would be expected in response to the legislative 
action. In terms of equation (6), the coefficient for the 
ECON variable ( ~ ) should not be statistically 
significantly different from zero. If full short-run 
shifting has not occurred, there should be a negative stock 
price reaction to the 1959 Ac~ and ~ should be negative 
and statistically significant. The results of the short-run 
shifting test are reported in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
RESULTS OF SHORT-RUN SHIFTING TEST 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
t-Statistic 
Approximate p 
-0.00031 
0.007 
-0.044 
.48 
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After controlling for market-wide and industry-wide 
movements, no significant reaction to the passage of The 
Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 was detected. 
Although the coefficient was negative, it was not 
statistically significant. This result suggests among 
previously mentioned possibilities that, in spite of a sig-
nificant increase in the corporate tax liability of life in-
surance companies, the market expected that there would be 
no decline in the after-tax rate of return on capital. In 
terms of tax incidence, the increased tax liability was 
simply shifted to consumers by way of higher premium prices 
andjor to labor by way of lower commissions. 
An examination of individual company estimates 
reinforces the results indicated from the cross-sectional 
averages. Parameter estimates by company are presented in 
Table VIII. Again, if the tax is not fully shifted in the 
short-run the coefficient for the ECON variable should be 
negative and statistically significant. However, only eight 
companies in the sample had statistically significant 
coefficients (10 percent level). In addition, exactly one-
half of these companies had a positive coefficient: the 
opposite of that predicted under no short-run shifting 
hypothesis. Given these results, there is no reason to 
believe that the cross-sectional averages are being driven 
by a few observations. 
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TABLE VIII 
COMPANY SPECIFIC PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE COMMON VARIABLE 
Co. 
No. ECON Std.Dev. T-Stat P Value 
1 0.0084 0.0070 1.212 0.2286 
2 -0.0028 0.0071 -0.396 0.6933 
3 0.0123 0.0075 1.628 0.1067 
4 -0.0044 0.0078 -0.559 0.5776 
5 -0.0018 0.0038 -0.462 0.6455 
6 0.0030 0.0045 0.653 0.5155 
7 -0.0113 0.0071 -1.588 0.1157 
8 -0.0068 0.0058 -1.171 0.2447 
9 0.0076 0.0073 1.039 0.3012 
10 0.0052 0.0077 0.37 0.5046 
11 0.0131 0.0091 1.433 0.1551 
12 -0.0007 0.0040 -0.169 0.8661 
13 0.0044 0.0075 0.584 0.5607 
14 0.0102 0.0057 1. 764 0.081 
15 -0.0011 0.0051 -0.231 0.8177 
16 0.0026 0.0077 0.346 0.7302 
17 0.0014 0.0072 0.201 0.841 
18 0.0010 0.0098 0.106 0.9158 
19 -0.0013 0.0062 -0.214 0.8309 
20 0.0074 0.0055 1.335 0.1852 
21 -0.0012 0.0054 -0.223 0.8242 
22 0.0038 0.0062 0.61 0.5436 
23 -0.0322 0.0118 -2.721 0.0077 
24 0.0006 0.0068 0.095 0.9249 
25 0.0026 0.0052 0.51 0.6115 
26 -0.0157 0.0079 -1.974 0.0512 
27 -0.0060 0.0106 -0.567 0.5718 
28 -0.0081 0.0058 -1.386 0.169 
29 -0.0035 0.0092 -0.0385 0.701 
30 0.0003 0.0041 0.081 0.9359 
31 -0.0073 0.0104 -0.703 0.4839 
32 -0.0016 0.0056 -0.294 0.7693 
33 -0.0001 0.0083 -0.013 0.9893 
34 -0.0034 0.0047 -0.728 0.4687 
35 0.0061 0.0104 0.59 0.5565 
36 0.0083 0.0078 1.062 0.291 
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As noted in Chapter V, Friday stock price data were 
unavailable for seven companies in the sample. As a result, 
Tuesday return data were used. Since the Tuesday companies 
may be traded less frequently than the Friday companies, a 
comparison of parameter estimates between the two subsets of 
firms is provided in Table IX. However, as can be seen, the 
coefficient for the ECON variable is not statistically 
significant in either subset of firms. Therefore, trading 
infrequency does not appear to have any impact on the 
overall results reported in Table VII. 
TABLE IX 
COMMON VARIABLE PARAMETER ESTIMATES: SUBSETS OF TUESDAY 
COMPANIES VERSUS FRIDAY COMPANIES 
Mean 
Standard Error 
t-statistic 
Approximate p 
Tuesday 
( 7 Companies) 
-.0000003 
.0067 
-.00004 
.495 
Friday 
(29 Companies) 
-.0003848 
.0071 
-.0542 
.485 
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Other Validation Procedures 
Two additional procedures were used in the data 
analysis phase of this research as a method of validating 
the previously discussed results. First, an alternative 
estimation technique was used for the 12 companies for which 
significant autocorrelation was indicated. Second, the 
possible impact of imprecise event date specification was 
examined. Reasons for these procedures, along with the 
results, are reported next. 
Autocorrelation Adjustments. As noted earlier in this 
chapter, significant first-order autocorrelation was 
indicated for 5 companies in the sample. In addition, the 
DW test was inconclusive on 7 other companies. Although OLS 
will generate unbiased coefficient estimates under this 
condition, the estimates are generally not efficient. More 
importantly, autocorrelation may cause the estimate of the 
variance to be biased and the usual OLS test statistic may 
be invalid [Judge, et al, 1985]. 
To assess the impact of autocorrelation on the OLS 
results reported earlier, estimated generalized least 
squares (EGLS) estimators were calculated for the 12 
companies. The EGLS estimator specifically takes into 
account the correlation in error terms when deriving 
parameter estimates. As a result, the EGLS estimator 
provides unbiased and asymptotically efficient coefficient 
and variance estimates. The coefficient estimate for the 
ECON variable, the standard error and the t-statistic for 
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the 12 companies are shown in Table X. As can be seen, 
neither model indicates a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for the ECON variable. 
TABLE X 
OLS AND EGLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE COMMON VARIABLE 
(12 Companies Only) 
Mean 
Standard Error 
t-statistic 
Approximate p 
OLS 
-0.00256 
.00656 
-0.3902 
.347 
EGLS 
-0.00379 
.00743 
-0.51 
.306 
Imprecise Prior Information. Earlier research into 
security price performance indicated that prior information 
as to the event date was important in specifying the power 
of the test [Brown and Warner, 1980]. In the current study, 
an attempt was made to isolate both the dates on which the 
market revised its probability assessments that the 1959 Act 
would be implemented and the dates on which the market 
revised its estimate of the ultimate tax burden to be 
imposed. However, if towards this end a significant number 
of "non-event" dates are included in the model, the results 
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could be biased towards finding no stock price reaction to 
the 1959 Act (i.e., consistent with full short-run 
shifting). 
To test for the effect of possible imprecise event 
dates, an alternative model was estimated using OLS. The 
purpose of this model was to isolate certain event dates on 
which there was a very high probability that the market 
would be making revisions in its estimate of the economic 
impact of the 1959 Act. If no stock price reaction was 
detected on these dates, it would be unlikely that imprecise 
event date specification was driving the results. 
The model used to test for the impact of possible 
imprecise event dates is similar to that described in 
equation (6) except that the ECON variable is now 
disaggregated into 5 common variables. 
Common Variables. The first four common variables are 
designed to capture the various deliberation period effects. 
They are: 
HWCt, SFCt, SDEBt and JCCt = dummy variables for 
deliberation periods; 
where HWC refers to the House Ways and Means Committee 
hearings, SFC refers to the Senate Finance Committee 
hearings, SDEB refers to the Senate floor debate on H.R. 
4245, and JCC refers to the Joint Conference Committee 
Report and passage in both the House and Senate. 
The HWC variable includes the returns for the week 
prior to the public hearing, the week of the committee 
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hearing and the week on which the House Ways and Means 
publically announced their final position on the proposed 
tax reform. This included a 540 million dollar estimate of 
the tax liability to be imposed on the life insurance 
industry as a whole. The HWC variable should capture an 
increase in the probability of passage of the 1959 Act as 
well as an increase in the estimated tax burden of life 
insurance companies. As a result, in the absence of full 
short-run shifting, the coefficient for the HWC variable 
should be negative and significantly different from zero. A 
one-tailed test is considered appropriate. 
In addition to being an event date on which changes in 
probability assessments occur, it is highly unlikely that 
the HW&M position would have been anticipated by investors. 
For example, it was reported in the National Underwriter 
that the life insurance industry seemed to be caught totally 
by surprise by the HW&M's switch to the 1950 formula and the 
magnitude of the tax burden to be imposed. 
The SFC variable includes the returns for the three 
week period surrounding the committee hearings and the week 
on which the Senate Finance Committee announced its official 
position. It ~s difficult to specify an a priori sign for 
the coefficient for the SFC variable. The SFC position can 
be seen as both good news and bad news for the industry. 
From a positive standpoint, the SFC reduce the expected tax 
burden from 540 million to 500 million. However, the Senate 
hearings also greatly increased the probability of passage 
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of the 1959 Act. Consequently, a two-tailed test seems most 
appropriate. 
The coefficients for the SDEB and JCC variables should 
both be negative. Under both cases, the probability of 
passage of the 1959 Act were increased. Therefore, a one-
tailed test is appropriate. 
The final common variable relates to important news 
announcement dates. It is as follows: 
NEWSt = dummy variable for news announcement events not 
included in the deliberation period variables 
outlined above. 
Since the NEWS variable may include both upward and downward 
revisions in probability assessments, no a priori 
expectation of the sign of the coefficient is possible. 
Therefore, a two-tailed test will be appropriate. 
The following set of 36 equations was estimated for the 
period between July 12, 1957 and June 12, 1959. 
Rit = Ai + BitRmt + oii + dHWM +eSFC + fSDEB + 
gJCC + hNEWS + Uit· 
(8) 
The results of equation (8) are reported in Table XI. 
Consistent with the hypothesis of full short-run shifting 
and the results reported in Table XI, none of the 
coefficients were significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, imprecision of the event dates does not appear to 
be a problem in evaluating the results of the original 
analysis. 
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TABLE XI 
OLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF DISAGGREGATE COMMON VARIABLES 
HWC SFC SDEB JCC NEWS 
Mean -0.00370 -0.00005 -0.00039 0.00352 0.00004 
Std. Dev. 0.01689 0.01344 0.02879 0.02709 0.00948 
t-stat. -0.219 -0.004 -0.014 0.13 0.004 
Approx p .415 .99 .49 .44 .99 
Summary. This chapter reported the results of the 
tests for shifting of the corporate income tax of life 
insurance companies. The empirical evidence examined for 
this study indicate that there was no significant stock 
price reaction to the passage of The Life Insurance Company 
Income Tax Act of 1959. This result suggests that, in spite 
of a ninety percent increase in the statutory tax liability 
of life insurance companies, the capital markets expected 
that after-tax cash flows would remain virtually unaffected 
by the 1959 Act. Alternatively stated, the market expected 
life insurance companies to fully shift the increased 
corporate tax burden to consumers andjor labor. 
Presumably, these companies are able to rapidly adjust their 
operations in response to tax law changes so as to maintain 
cash flows that would have existed in the absence of the 
legislative action. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, 
EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter first reports a summary of the results and 
the conclusions based thereon. Finally, limitations of the 
study and possible tax policy implications and extensions 
are discussed. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to provide empirical 
evidence as to the economic burden of the corporate income 
tax of life insurance companies. Specifically, this 
research applied an events study methodology to estimate the 
economic effect of the increased tax liability imposed under 
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959. Based 
on the hypothesized relationship between the stock price 
reaction to the 1959 Act and the economic burden of the 
corporate shareholder, the results of this study provide 
ev1dence that the market believes that life insurance 
companies were able to successfully engage in short-run 
sh1fting behavior. 
The general topic of inquiry addressed by this research 
has been the subject of extensive debate and empirical 
1nvestigation. 
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Although the traditional tax incidence theory described in 
Chapter III generally posits a position of no short-run 
shifting, there is reason to doubt the applicability of that 
abstract conclusion. Certain modifications to the 
assumptions underlying the theoretical results may lead to 
behavior which intends to shift the corporate income tax. 
However, whether or not these attempts are successful must 
ultimately be determined empirically. 
A detailed description of the empirical research into 
corporate tax incidence was provided in Chapter IV. The 
early periods of this research were dominated by rather 
simple descriptive studies. Concerted efforts to address 
the methodological problems of the early research eventually 
led to the development of complex econometric profit 
behavior models. Although these models were more rigorous 
than the early empirical works, their ability to isolate a 
tax effect has been subject to much criticism. 
Consequently, the contribution of further research applying 
profit behavior models has been seriously questioned. 
From a methodological perspective, the approach taken 
in this research sets it apart from prior empirical 
research. First, it is the only application of an events 
study methodology specifically addressing the question of 
corporate tax shifting. More importantly, this research 
seems immune to the major criticism of the prior econometric 
studies. These studies have been criticized for their 
failure to isolate the tax effect from other factors which 
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bear on the determination of corporate rate of return. By 
using narrow event windows, the current study has greatly 
reduced the problem of mistaking correlation with causation. 
Therefore, this thesis can be seen as a form of 
triangulation with respect to the study of corporate tax 
incidence. Prior to this research, there were two 
econometric tax incidence studies which yielded results 
consistent with a full short-run shifting of the corporate 
income tax in the life insurance industry. Although a 
completely different methodology was applied, the results of 
this thesis are virtually identical to those obtained from 
the earlier econometric tax incidence studies. These 
results, coupled with the evidence from prior econometric 
research, yield strong evidence that life insurance 
companies have been able to completely avoid the economic 
burden of the corporate income tax. 
Limitations of the Study 
As with any empirical research, there are limitations 
which may affect the reported results and the ability to 
generalize the results beyond the specific sample of the 
study. The most important limitations with respect to this 
research are the problems associated with identification of 
relevant event dates and the lack of data for many of the 
companies in the industry. 
Specification of event dates poses a two-fold problem. 
First, due to the political nature of the event, 
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identification of all dates on which revisions in either 
probability assessments or revisions in the magnitude of the 
tax burden is a difficult process. Consequently, failure to 
identify all of the relevant event dates could lead to 
results which are biased in an unknown direction. On the 
other hand, as more event dates are added to the model, the 
problem of confounding events is greatly increased. 
Another potential limitation of the study stems from 
the inability to obtain stock price data for many of the 
smaller companies in the industry. Since the companies 
included in the sample tend to be larger and more widely 
held than the population of insurance companies as a whole, 
caution should applied in extending the results beyond the 
companies within the sample. Along the same line, due to 
the methodology applied, mutual insurance companies were 
entirely excluded from the sample. Therefore, no attempt 
should be made to assess the extent of shifting for such 
companies. 
Tax Policy Implications and Extensions 
As was discussed in Chapter I, the corporate income tax 
is seen as influencing a variety of economic activities. 
Although tax policy assessments are beyond the scope of this 
research, it may useful to highlight the types of questions 
and problems that are generated by a full shifting of the 
corporate income tax of life insurance companies. 
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In spite of substantial changes to the 1959 Act, the 
area of life insurance taxation continues to be one of the 
most complex calculations in the Internal Revenue Code. 
Given the results of this study, the need for a special tax 
structure for life insurance companies should be considered. 
If substantially all of the corporate tax burden of life 
insurance companies is shifted, it would appear that the 
intricate provisions related to life insurance company 
taxation may be unnecessary. Given the current rhetoric 
toward tax simplification, a major tax revision in this area 
would seem appropriate. 
In assessing the overall distribution of the tax 
burden, it is generally concluded that a non-shifted 
corporate tax has progressive redistributional effects. 
Therefore, to the extent that the tax is shifted forward to 
consumers, it may have many of the regressive effects that 
are normally associated with a sales tax. In addition, 
substituting the "shifted" corporate tax with an equal yield 
excise tax would appear to be administratively easier and 
the incidence of the tax would be known well in advance. 
Finally, the implications of this study extend far 
beyond the narrow topic addressed in this thesis. Tax 
policy decisions are often based on very restrictive 
assumptions about the market setting in which United States 
industries operate. For example, the large scale simulation 
analysis discussed in Chapter IV assumed that the short-run 
burden of the corporate income tax is borne by capital in 
all industries. This assumption must be seriously 
questioned in light of the results of this study. 
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Although the results of this study provide concrete 
evidence that the corporate income tax has been shifted by 
life insurance companies, the direction of the shifting has 
yet to be determined. An obvious extension of this research 
would be to attempt to assess whether consumers or labor is 
ultimately bearing the economic burden of the corporate 
income tax levied on life insurance companies. 
At a more fundamental level, it is hoped that the 
research completed for this thesis will stimulate a more 
careful consideration and evaluation of the types of market 
imperfections that lead to a shifting of the corporate 
income tax. The potential benefit of such an analysis 
includes, but is not limited to, a more intelligent solution 
to the revenue generation problems currently facing Congress. 
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APPENDIX 
CORPORATE TAX SHIFTING: SALES 
MAXIMIATION BEHAHIOR 
Baumel's [1973] model may be formalized by considering 
' 
a firm that produces only a single product. The firm seeks 
to maximize total revenue 
R = P • X (1) 
subject to the profit constraint 
1'( = (1 - t) (R - C -,A) = Tfo (2) 
where R = total sales, A = advertising expenditures, and ~ 
is the minimum profit level. The two decision variables are 
'' 
output (X) and advertising expenditures (A). By forming the 
Lagrangian function (L) and setting the partial derivatives 
of L with respect to X and A equal to zero, the necessary 
conditions for revenue maximization are determined: 
L=R+t\[(1-t) (R-C-A) -ito]; (3) 
J.L/t X = ol_R/el.X +(I (1 - t) (./-R/.LX - ti.Ch{X) = O; (4) 
JL/1.. A = J.R/J..A + (I ( 1 - t) ( /JV,l.A - J.C/J..A) = 0. ( 5) 
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Solving (4) and (5) for J.R/J.:x and J..R/ufA yields 
(1 - t) 
,).R/J.. X = -----------------
1+(i(1-t) 
(j.C/ti..X) , and (6) 
LR/J..A 
(1 -t) 
= -----------------
1+tl(1-t) 
(7) 
Since the term (1 - t) does not cancel, there will be a tax 
effect. To determine the implications of the first-order 
optimality conditions for sales maximization, it must be 
shown that .LR/J..A < 1 and that .LR/LX < J. c;t. X. 
The proof that LR/iA < 1 is given by the assumption of 
sales maximization. If JR/~A ~ 1, then increasing 
advertising expenditures would increase revenues without 
reducing profits. Therefore, LR/~A < 1 must hold for the 
firm to operating at the maximal level. 
The proof that ~R/~X < dC/~X can be shown from 
equations (6) and (7). Substituting equation (7) into 
equation (6) yields: 
J..R/i.X = (J.R/t.A) (J.R/g{C) (8) 
Since J...R/.(A < 1, then .L.R/LX < ,LR/'-.C. That is, marginal 
revenue will be less than marginal cost. Therefore, the 
sales maximizing firm will be leaving some profits 
unrealized. The implication for shifting is that a firm 
will raise its price (reduce output) in response to a tax 
increase in order to maintain a minimum level of profits. 
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